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6In England, the government plans to incentivise spending of billions of pounds over 
the next few years promoting apprenticeships, with most of the finance raised from the 
apprenticeship levy on employers.
Promoting more apprenticeships is designed to improve England’s skill base – a 
government policy priority given the relatively low level of skills and educational 
qualifications amongst a large part of the country’s workforce.
But does such a policy make sense in an English context, with a historically limited 
participation of many employers in work related formal training?
Is additional spending on apprenticeships likely to lead to positive economic returns for 
employers, workers and for England itself? And how varied are the net economic returns 
by employer and by sector? What works for one category of employment may not bring 
positive gains where returns to training are much lower. 
To answer these questions the JPMorgan Chase Foundation, the Education Policy 
Institute and the Bertelsmann Stiftung have come together and partnered with the 
internationally acknowledged economist Prof. Dr. Stefan C. Wolter to explore the 
costs and benefits of apprenticeship training for companies in England. This report 
by Prof. Dr. Stefan C. Wolter and Eva Joho brings a much needed degree of rigour and 
quantification to a policy area which is too often characterised by assumption, hunch, 
and international experience which may not apply in a very different country context.
The authors have used evidence from Germany, Switzerland and Austria to simulate 
the costs and benefits of an apprenticeship policy applied in an English context. They 
are aware of the limitations of this approach - not least given the different tradition of 
employer engagement in England - but the analysis in this report is important and could 
help guide employer and government policies in directions that maximise economic 
returns and limit low return scenarios.
In particular, the return by occupations is shown to be highly varied based on the return 
and cost characteristics of each sector. The returns by employer within each sector also 
vary markedly.
The key conclusions the authors have derived in the report could help steer English 
policymakers and employers in more evidence based directions, which should help 
ensure that England’s large investment in this area is properly informed by evidence 
and more likely to yield positive returns. In addition, the present study complements 
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studies with a similar methodology in Spain (2016) and Italy (to be published 2018), 
which will enable learnings for successful implementation of apprenticeship models 
across countries.  
We are obliged to Prof. Dr. Stefan C. Wolter and to Eva Joho for authoring the study. Their 
knowledge of vocational education and their experience in the cost-benefit analysis 
of apprenticeship training systems have made the present study a reality. We are also 
thankful to the participants of the workshops that were conducted during the research 
process. 
Hang Ho
Head of Philanthropy for Europe, Middle East, Africa and Latin America, 
J.P. Morgan
Rt. Hon. David Laws
Executive Chairman, 
Education Policy Institute
Clemens Wieland 
Senior Project Manager Learning for Life Program, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung
8Executive Summary
Countries with a high share of young people choosing apprenticeship training rather than 
either general education or full-time schooling options have not only demonstrated low 
youth unemployment rates but also distinctively lower ratios of youth unemployment 
relative to the overall unemployment rates of the country. Therefore many people 
consider apprenticeship training as a possible and potentially powerful solution to the 
problem of an often prolonged and difficult transition for youths from school to the 
labour market. However, these systems demand high involvement of firms, which is 
not common in countries that do not have this tradition of apprenticeship training 
(any more). Because many firms fear the costs of training apprentices, and despite 
the political support, the dissemination of apprenticeship models has not seen much 
success in the last ten years. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the OECD, in 
their recommendations for a better skills’ policy in England (OECD, 2017b, p.10), ask for 
more business cases of “successful employee training examples that have led to high 
return on investment for employers”. 
If one wants to spread the apprenticeship type of training, it is important to convince 
firms that apprenticeship models are a potential win-win-win situation, creating 
benefits not only for students and the public purse but also for the training firms. One 
way of doing so is by measuring the costs and benefits of firms that train apprentices; 
however, representative data are currently only available for Germany and Switzerland 
and, more recently, Austria. In this study, we will – for several reasons – not measure 
the costs and benefits of existing training schemes in England, but we simulate the costs 
and benefits for English firms that would train in one out of ten different occupations 
in very different economic sectors. To be able to simulate these outcomes, we use data 
from Switzerland, where, over a decade, more than twenty thousand training and non-
training firms have provided extensive data on their investments, benefits of training, 
and reasons for either training or abstaining from doing so. This study therefore 
analyses the question of whether an average English firm could expect a net benefit 
when training apprentices in a similar manner to Swiss firms. 
The ten occupations for which we simulated the net costs of training are in alphabetical 
order: bricklayers, car mechanics, care workers, commercial bank employees, cooks, 
electricians, financial analysts and advisors, IT/software developers, retail cashiers and 
waiters/waitresses. 
The simulation model consists of three components, for which we use data from the 
most recent Swiss cost and benefit survey, which are complemented with UK wage data. 
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The three components are: 
a)  the costs that arise during the training period, 
b)  the benefits that firms can generate during the training period by letting apprentices 
substitute unskilled and skilled workers, and 
c)  the benefits that a firm can potentially generate after the training period has ended, 
i.e., by filling vacancies for skilled workers with their own apprentices.
In this study, however, we are not able to provide representative figures of the potential 
size of these saved hiring costs in England, as we have not had not enough observation 
from participating firms for each occupation that we analyse. However, we have helpful 
indications from the Swiss studies, which we can compare with the net costs of training 
after the training period has ended. 
Additionally, we also simulate the consequences of our scenarios and models on the 
private rates of return to education, which is the net benefit that the apprentices could 
expect over their life-time. This addition to the present study is necessary, because, 
as will be shown, most firms in England in most of the occupations for which we run 
our simulations will only break-even (having no net-costs of training) if they pay 
apprentices’ salaries that are either close to or even below current minimum wages. 
The results of our net cost simulations for all occupations and scenarios, shows, that the 
net costs in all models using a low apprentices wage scenario are (with one exception) 
close to zero or even negative, in other words generating a net benefit. In the high-
wage scenario, about half of the occupations and models show net costs equivalent to 
one monthly salary or more of a skilled worker. In some cases the simulations lead to 
net benefits that are extremely high, that is for bricklayers, electricians, and IT/software 
developers. In these cases, apprentices pay could be substantially higher than in our 
models and still guarantee the training firms to break-even by the end of the training 
period. For some occupations, however, our simulations show extremely high net 
costs for the high-wage scenario, as it is the case for car mechanics, commercial bank 
employees, cooks, retail cashiers, and waiters. In the case of car mechanics and cooks, 
it is mainly the high share of non productive practicing that reduces the benefits and 
would therefore legitimate a lower wage than assumed in the high-wage scenario. In the 
case of commercial bank employees, it is the costs of training hours that would justify 
a lower pay, and in the cases of care workers, retail cashiers, and waiters, it is the low 
absolute level of salaries as well as the small differential between unskilled and skilled 
salaries that creates net costs or pushes down the break-even salaries. 
If we compare these net costs with potential savings in hiring costs if the firm is able 
to keep the apprentices after the training contract has ended, we find that with the 
exception of waiters, in all occupations, the savings in hiring costs have the potential to 
cover the net costs even in a more expensive training model, provided the firms are able 
to retain their apprentices after training. Therefore, incorporating potential benefits to 
the firms after the training has ended would make the training models viable in most 
cases and for most occupations. 
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Using our different wage scenarios for apprentices, we also calculate the rates of return to 
education for apprentices. We find that in most of the occupations, even low apprentices 
salaries should guarantee substantial rates of return to education for the individuals to 
make these training models also attractive to students. The exceptions to these, are a) 
electricians, where the firms – according to our net cost simulations – should have the 
scope to raise the salary levels for apprentices such that these could expect sufficiently 
high rates of return, and b) care workers, retail cashiers, and waiters, where the room of 
manoeuvre is likely to be limited, in particular for the latter. In other words, the training 
models for which we have made simulations would not allow firms and apprentices to 
gain sufficiently, and therefore, the willingness of the firms or potential apprentices to 
train or receive training in these occupations according to these parameters would be low. 
Two options would exist, however, to find a way to increase the attractiveness in these 
occupations. The first option would be that potential apprentices to accept low salaries 
during training and for firms to invest sufficiently in training allowing the apprentices 
to expect skilled wages that are above the levels observed on the UK labour market today. 
Firms would not incur higher net costs and therefore would not need to fear poaching 
from competitors. Additionally, the potential apprentices could see the lower salaries 
during training compensated with better salary perspective for the following years of 
their professional life. The second option would be for firms to accept net costs during 
training as an investment in future middle management positions, where hiring costs 
are substantially higher than for lower level positions. In this option, firms would 
consider their apprentices as the potential future middle managers and the net costs of 
training apprentices as the necessary investment into this group of employees. In this 
case, firms would of course have to fear poaching from competitors and therefore would 
need to make some extra arrangements to prevent high turnover rates of their trained 
apprentices, including the provision of firm-specific human capital. 
Finally, and not surprisingly, the simulated costs and benefits show a considerable 
heterogeneity, due to differences in the results per occupation in the Swiss data and 
to variations in the wage differentials between unskilled and skilled workers in the ten 
occupations in England. Thus, the question whether a training firm would have to expect 
net costs or could rather enjoy a net benefit when applying a Swiss-like training model 
depends on many factors that will differ from one occupation to another. Furthermore, 
the simulations show that, within a given occupation, results may vary considerably 
between firms of different sizes. In any case, the simulations show that policies targeted 
to increase the number of apprenticeships would need to take into account these 
heterogeneities between occupations, firms, and regions. 
The five main conclusions that we can draw from our report are the following: 
1)  The chances for firms of breaking even at the end of the training period of an 
apprenticeship are highest for three-year programs assuming that the apprentices 
are younger than 19 years, because minimum wages increase substantially 
afterwards. Therefore, apprenticeships for young people as an alternative to school-
based general education or school-based vocational training may produce the best 
outcomes from the perspective of firms. 
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2)  From the perspective of apprentices, the programs that would start at an early age, 
even at a very low pay, would in most cases also generate the highest private rates of 
return, compared to scenarios, where the apprentices follow a program at a later age. 
3)  In most occupations and scenarios, big firms have the highest net benefits, whereas 
micro-companies (less than ten employees) may sometimes even face net costs in 
scenarios where the average firm can expect net benefits. In sectors where micro 
companies are the backbone of the industry, particular policy measures to stimulate 
firms’ engagement would need to be considered, whereas bigger firms often do not 
need special stimuli. 
4)  In most of the ten occupations, at least one or two models and scenario produce net 
benefits or firms can expect saved hiring costs that could offset net costs. Yet three 
occupations in the retail sector and the catering & hospitality sector (cooks, retail 
cashiers, and waiters) produce simulation outcomes that show difficulties for firms 
to break even. In the three cases, the skill premium observable today in the UK labour 
market is too low to guarantee favourable outcomes for firms and apprentices. In 
these occupations and sectors, one would need to see whether an improved quality 
of training would increase the workers’ productivity and wages sufficiently to make 
the training investment worthwhile for firms and potential apprentices. 
5)  Improvements in the quality of training programs that would improve the labour 
market outcomes of apprentices could be a necessity to secure talented applicants 
for the programs and thereby also reduce dropout rates. The latter may hamper the 
willingness of firms to train in some occupations because they would increase the 
net costs of training. 
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After the outbreak of the financial crises in 2008 persistently high youth unemployment 
rates in many industrialised countries have brought the apprenticeship training models 
that are predominantly used in the German-speaking countries (Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland) to the attention of policy makers, business leaders, academic scholars, 
and the public (e.g. OECD, 2010). Countries with a high share of youth choosing 
apprenticeship training rather than either general education or full-time schooling 
options have not only achieved lower youth unemployment rates but also distinctively 
lower ratios of youth unemployment relative to the overall unemployment rates of 
the country. In addition, skills’ shortages or skill mismatches are not as frequent in 
these countries as in countries with predominantly school-based general education 
programmes. 
Although many people consider apprenticeship training as a possible and potentially 
powerful solution to the problem of an often prolonged and difficult transition for 
youths from school to the labour market, these systems demand high involvement of 
firms, which is not common in countries that do not have this tradition of apprenticeship 
training (any more). Delegating a substantial part of the educational responsibilities to 
firms makes them not only users but also providers of education, and this comes at a cost 
for firms. As firms are used to a situation where either the public purse or the students 
themselves cover educational costs, it is, therefore, not surprising that there is a lack of 
enthusiasm from firms to bear these costs. Looking to countries where apprenticeships 
are still common does not automatically calm such fears, because cost-benefit analyses 
in Germany have shown for decades that the average German training firm1 must bear 
the net-costs of training and that only rather rigid labour market regulations allow these 
firms to recoup these net-investments in the long run. In other countries, like Austria or 
Norway, public subsidies help keep the firms active in the training market, but the fiscal 
situation does not allow every country to support training firms, and, in most countries, 
firms are not particularly eager to pay higher taxes initially to receive some subsidies 
later. Finally, the political support for apprenticeships is quite often the consequence of 
empty treasuries and politicians looking for training models that put less strain on the 
public budgets, which contributes to raising major doubts in economic circles that the 
support for apprenticeships is just an attempt to shift the costs of training and education 
from the government to the firms. For these and other reasons, and despite the political 
support, the dissemination of apprenticeship models has not seen much success in 
the last ten years. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the OECD, in their 
recommendations for a better skills’ policy (OECD, 2017b, p.10), ask for business cases 
1  A training firm in the German, Austrian, or Swiss context is a firm whose main business is not training but the 
production of goods and services. Therefore, when we speak of training or non-training firms in this text, this 
should not be confounded with training providers, whose main business is training students for firms. 
Combating youth 
unemployment
Firms have to pay
1 Introduction 
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of “successful employee training examples that have led to high return on investment 
for employers”. 
Therefore, if one wants to spread the apprenticeship type of training, important to 
convince firms that apprenticeship models are a potential win-win-win situation, 
creating benefits not only for students and the public purse but also for the training 
firms. One way of doing so is by measuring the costs and benefits of firms that train 
apprentices; however, representative data are currently only available for Germany 
and Switzerland and, more recently, Austria. Measuring the costs and benefits of 
apprenticeship in case studies, covering just a handful of firms, as has been done in 
some countries, can lead to deceptive results for non-training firms, as the selective 
cases are usually not representative. Furthermore, measuring cost and benefits in a 
country that is in the phase of either introducing or reforming apprenticeships has at 
least three potential additional shortcomings. First, the training models used by training 
firms very often differ from firm to firm; second, in a phase of introduction and reform 
one cannot always be sure that the models in place are performing as expected; and 
third, the models are very often not stable over time but subject to constant adaptations 
and changes. In other words, trying to measure something that is showing high diversity 
across firms, regions, and economic sectors and is changing from day to day has limited 
informational value for non-training firms in their decision-making process and for 
policymakers evaluating the framework conditions of their system. Therefore, we have 
adopted a ‘simulation’ approach for this report.
By international comparison, participation rates in employer-sponsored non-formal 
training and work-related formal training are low in the United Kingdom (UK) and have 
– despite many government initiatives – declined over time (OECD, 2017b). Therefore, 
in this study, we both propose and test whether apprenticeship training could be a 
viable way for firms in England to expand work-based training and, if yes, under what 
conditions. 
We will not measure the costs and benefits of existing training schemes in England, 
but we will simulate the costs and benefits for English firms that would train in ten 
occupations in very different economic sectors. To be able to simulate these outcomes, 
we use data from Switzerland,2 where, over a decade, more than twenty thousand doing 
so and non-training firms have provided extensive data on their investments, benefits 
of training, and reasons for either training or abstaining from doing so. We use this data 
as the base for our simulations, combining it with labour market data from the UK. The 
advantage of simulating, rather than measuring cost and benefits, is that we can choose 
different models and parameters and, therefore, measure the sensitivity of outcomes for 
these assumptions. This allows us, not only to make a statement about whether training 
is beneficial but also to define both the framework and the parameters of a hypothetical 
model that would work (see Muehlemann and Wolter, 2017). 
In summary, this study analyses the question of whether an average English firm could 
expect a net benefit when training apprentices in a similar manner to Swiss firms but 
2  Readers wishing to know more about the Swiss apprenticeship training system may find useful information in 
this documentation (SERI 2017).
Measuring costs and 
benefits
Low participation rates
Simulating a Swiss 
training scheme for 
England
Simulating rates of 
return to education for 
individuals
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does not evaluate either current English apprenticeships or current policy measures.3 
Additionally, we also (see chapter 6) simulate the consequences of our scenarios and 
models for the private rates of return to education,4 which is the net benefit that 
the apprentices could expect over their life-time. This addition to the present study 
is necessary, because, as will be shown later, most firms in England in most of the 
occupations for which we run our simulations will only break-even (having no net-
costs of training) if they pay apprentices’ salaries that are either close to or even below 
current minimum wages. 
3  This study complements a similar earlier study done in Spain (Wolter and Muehlemann 2014) and another study 
covering Italy that is in preparation, using the same methodology.
4  We speak of private rates of return to education when we calculate the costs and returns to education from the 
perspective of the individual in either training or education. 
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2  The importance of costs and benefits  
for the decision to train apprentices5
The willingness of firms to train apprentices can be described as the “conditio sine qua 
non” (necessary condition) for the existence of an apprenticeship training system. 
Irrespective of how much a government likes to have an apprenticeship training system, 
it cannot be established without firms willing to take on the apprentices. Therefore, it is 
crucial to understand both the motivation of firms to invest in apprenticeship training 
and the conditions that are necessary to persuade more firms to participate.5
Training investments, from the perspective of firms, are similar to all other business 
investments, which means that firms invest if they to obtain a sufficiently high 
return on investment (ROI) and that firms renounce investments if they expect a 
loss. Empirical analyses6 of successful apprenticeship training models show that the 
sustainable engagement of firms mainly depends on training regulations, labour market 
regulations and institutions, and the education policy of the government. An example 
for the importance of the latter is, e.g., the policy of admission to general education 
(high school and university) and the financing of it. If the standards for admission into 
general schools are low and the financing of general education is predominantly public, 
then firms are confronted with a situation in which most of the talented youth will try 
the general education route. This would leave only the less-talented students for the 
apprenticeship market, which would in turn lead to a situation in which the training 
costs for firms might simply be too high (because less-talented apprentices would need 
more support and training) and the productivity of the potential apprentices too low. 
Even in the case that the net costs of training are bearable, firms might decide not to 
train because the skill level of the potential apprentices would still be lower than the 
expected skill level of either university or college graduates after a short period of on-
the-job training. In other words, policy makers have many ways of not only directly 
influencing a firm’s costs and benefits of training but also influencing the costs of 
alternative methods of recruiting skilled workers that could compete with the decision 
to train apprentices. 
A critical point, as with all other investments, is the fact that the costs of training arise 
early in the investment period, whereas the benefits come either later, sometimes too 
late, or not at all. The latter may occur because other firms poach the trained workers, 
5  Chapters 2–4 are adapted and revised extensions of the respective chapters in the simulations for Spain (Wolter 
and Muehlemann 2015). We follow as closely as possible the line of arguments and the assumptions used in the 
Spanish case to allow for future comparative work between different countries for which we have simulated the 
costs and benefits of apprenticeship. 
6  Wolter and Ryan (2011) provide an extensive description of the theoretical foundations for analysing firms’ 
decisions whether be active in apprenticeship training. Muehlemann and Wolter (2014) provide a literature 
overview of cost-benefit studies and empirical issues related to the question of how the costs and benefits of 
apprenticeship training influence firms’ training behaviour. 
Companies’ motivations 
for investment
Return on investment
Risk of losses
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because the trained workers leave after training for further education, or for other 
reasons. In such cases, the net investments at the end of the training period are no 
longer covered by the benefits that would have been generated if the trained worker had 
stayed with the training company. The uncertainty about the timing of the benefits, the 
size of the benefits, or even the risk that no benefits are collected is, therefore, crucial 
for a firm’s decision to be active in the apprenticeship training market. A sustainable 
training system must, therefore, find ways to reduce the risk that the training might 
not generate a sufficiently large benefit to cover the firms’ investment. Looking at the 
existing models for which we have cost-benefit data, one can see that, broadly speaking, 
there are three different ways of doing so.
One is the Swiss model, where training firms, on average, cover their training 
expenditures by the time the official training period ends and the apprentice is free to 
leave the company. In this situation, the threat of poaching is no longer a problem for 
the firm’s decision to train because, even if the apprentice leaves the company the day 
after finishing the apprenticeship, the firm does not incur a loss. The challenge for firms 
in Switzerland that train apprentices is, therefore, to find ways for the apprentices to 
generate sufficiently high benefits for the firm during the training period while at the 
same time guaranteeing the provision of high-quality training to the apprentices. The 
benefits mainly depend on training regulations that allow apprentices to spend much of 
their training time with the firm, working while being with the firm, and, finally, being 
productive while working. 
The second case is the German apprenticeship system, where labour market regulations 
at least partially protect the net investments of firms by reducing the labour market 
mobility of former apprentices (see e.g. Muehlemann et al., 2010). Rigid employment 
protection rules (like regulations that make dismissals either costly or almost impossible) 
not only secure stable jobs for the employed but also reduce the labour market mobility 
of potentially mobile workers because employment protection reduces the number of job 
vacancies in the labour market. In such a situation, training firms anticipate that their 
own apprentices are likely to remain with the training company because the probability 
of receiving an outside job offer is low, as potential competitors have to retain their 
own workforce. Thus, a net investment in apprentices protects at least partially from 
poaching. If labour markets are deregulated, however, firms must switch to a training 
policy that allows them to either reduce the net costs of training or even break even so 
as not to risk losing their investment to non-training firms. The reaction of German 
training firms during the last decade shows that this is exactly the way that firms react 
(see Jansen et al., 2015). The fact that German firms have, over the course of the last 
decade, adopted a training strategy that increasingly resembles the strategy applied by 
Swiss firms provides an additional reason to use Swiss data for the simulations in this 
study. 
The third model is the Austrian one. In Austria, firms have on average net-costs, 
comparable to German firms, but they differ in two distinctive ways from German firms. 
Firstly, the reason for the net-costs are not so much a result of apprentices not being 
used extensively in productive work but rather because of high relative apprentice pay 
compared to skilled workers. Secondly, public subsidies to firms cover only a part of the 
net-costs and may be the cause for even higher apprentice pay as the level of subsidies 
is linked to the level of apprentices’ pay. A comparison with comparable Swiss training 
Securing benefits during 
training (Switzerland)
Securing benefits after 
training (Germany)
Securing benefits with 
public subsidies (Austria)
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firms (see Moretti et al., 2017) shows that, if Austrian firms switched to apprentice pay 
levels comparable to Switzerland, most Austrian companies could break-even at the 
end of the training period. The reason why Austrian firms are paying high apprentices’ 
salaries and accepting net-costs of training is most probably that the competition for 
talented apprentices with full-time vocational schools is fierce (in Switzerland full-
time vocational schools are much less common) and, because of higher labour market 
regulation, Austrian firms can recoup more of their training costs after the training 
period.
In addition to systemic parameters that influence the average training pattern and 
strategies in a country as a whole, one can also observe differences in training strategies 
between firms of different sizes, sectors, occupations, and geographic locations that are 
related to differences in expected post-training benefits. 
Very small firms are usually unable to offer future employment to (all) of their apprentices 
and, therefore, they need to break even by the end of the training period; otherwise, they 
are almost certain to lose their investment (see Muehlemann and Wolter, 2014, p. 16ff). 
The lower the chances that these firms can break even by the end of training, the lower 
will be the participation rate of small firms in apprenticeship training. As small firms are 
the backbone of the economy in many countries, the possibility of achieving net benefits 
within a short time frame is essential for the emergence of apprenticeship training. 
Firms operating in sectors or training occupations that offer the possibility of training 
firm- or occupation-specific skills are more protected against the poaching of their 
trained apprentices, as apprentices would lose a considerable part of their skills when 
moving to another sector or firm. In particular, skilled workers in technically advanced 
firms operating at the forefront of technological progress are in such a position. 
The degree to which a firm can protect itself against losing its skilled workers also 
depends on the geographic location of the firm (Muehlemann and Wolter, 2011; 
Muehlemann et al., 2013). Although most firms do not use uniquely firm-specific skills, 
depending on their geographic location they might be just far away enough from the 
next firm that uses a similar set of skills that most employees would not accept the 
costs of either commuting or moving to another region for only a small salary increase. 
However, most firms operate either in economic regions with dense economic activity 
or in sectorial clusters that come with a high risk that there will be several employers 
looking for the same set of skills. In this situation, even bigger firms need the possibility 
to break even with their investments before the training ends to have an incentive to 
be active in training. 
Finally, even if the framework conditions in a country are such that some firms could 
earn a net benefit from apprenticeship training, this is usually not the case for all firms 
(see Wolter et al., 2006) because the specific situation differs considerably between 
individual firms with respect to their potential to run an apprenticeship training 
programme profitably. The challenge for countries is that the framework conditions 
should be good enough for a sufficiently large share of companies to offer training 
positions. There will always be companies for which “buying”, that is, recruiting skilled 
workers from other firms, is cheaper than training their own personnel internally (see 
Blatter et al., 2017). However, the higher the probability that a training company can 
Other influential factors
Company size
Firm specific skills
Geographic location
Framework conditions
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finish a training programme with a net benefit, the higher the chances that the training 
decision will not be affected by other firms’ recruitment strategies. 
The following chapter provides an overview of the most important parts of the costs and 
benefits arising from apprenticeship training that a potential training firm must take 
into consideration when calculating its ROI.
19
A cost-benefit model to simulate the net costs (or benefits) from the perspective of a 
firm has been used several times over the last two decades in Germany, Switzerland, 
and, more recently, Austria to gather representative data on the costs and benefits of 
apprenticeship training. The model has been refined over time but has remained stable 
and supported for the most part since its conception in the 1970s. The lessons from the 
application of the model in different countries during different periods of the business 
cycle and in hundreds of different occupational profiles covering most of the economic 
sectors in a modern economy helps us to identify the most relevant parameters of the 
model to simulate net cost scenarios for a dual apprenticeship system outside of the 
German-speaking countries, in this case for England. 
The model consists of three components, for which we use data from the most recent 
Swiss survey and complemented with UK data. The three components are the costs that 
arise during the training period, the benefits that firms can generate during the training 
period by letting apprentices substitute unskilled and skilled workers, and the benefits 
that a firm can potentially generate after the training period has ended, i.e., by filling 
vacancies for skilled workers with their own apprentices. 
In particular, a firm’s cost components of apprenticeship training (as described in 
Muehlemann and Wolter, 2014, p.3) consist of the following categories:
1)  Wages of apprentices: regular wage payments, irregular wage payments, and 
compensation for food, travel costs, or living expenditures.
2)  Costs of training personnel: costs for full-time, part-time, and external training 
personnel for the period in which they are unable to work productively because they 
are instructing apprentices.
3)  Recruitment and administrative costs: wage costs for administrative tasks and 
recruitment related to apprenticeship training.
4)  Costs of infrastructure: machinery/appliances for apprentices at the workplace, 
rent for premises necessary for apprenticeship training, cost of premises and 
infrastructure for company training centres.
5)  Cost of supplies: costs of supplies used for non-productive activities in the workplace; 
costs of books, learning software, and videos; and costs of working equipment.
Background of the model
Model components
3  The cost-benefit model and its 
components
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6)  Other costs: costs of fees (e.g. exams), costs of recruitment/administration related 
to apprenticeship training, and costs of external courses, duties, and taxes to third 
parties. 
A firm’s benefit components of apprenticeship training consist of the following 
categories: 
1)  The value of having apprentices perform skilled tasks is calculated as the time that 
apprentices spend on such tasks multiplied by the wage that a firm would need to 
pay skilled workers if no apprentices had been hired. That value, however, is further 
multiplied by the productivity of an apprentice relative to that of a skilled worker.7 
2)  For unskilled tasks, the value to the firm from having an apprentice perform such 
work is simply the wage that the firm would have had to pay an unskilled worker.8
Ultimately, the difference between the costs and benefits of training results in net 
benefits (or net costs) for the firm by the end of the training period.
As described in the previous chapter, for many reasons, most firms need to either 
achieve net benefits or at least break even by the time the training contract ends because 
all investments not covered by then are at risk of loss if the trainee moves to another 
company or quits for other reasons. 
For those firms that can expect all or at least some of their apprentices to stay with them 
for at least some time, an additional benefit comes into play. If a firm can fill vacancies 
for skilled workers with their own apprentices, they can save on hiring costs, which 
would then justify even a net investment by the time the formal training period has 
ended (see Muehlemann and Strupler, 2015). Although hiring an apprentice is costly, 
hiring skilled workers is usually much more expensive. Therefore, in the cost-benefit 
model, we also calculate the following costs that would arise from recruiting a skilled 
worker on the external labour market:
1) Search costs (job advertisements, job interviews, etc.).
2)  Costs that stem from an initially lower productivity compared to the internally 
trained workers because the employees hired externally have to learn firm-specific 
processes and technologies.
7  Thus, if it takes an apprentice twice as long to complete a certain task than it does a skilled worker, the relative 
productivity is 50 %, which means that the value to the firm of having an apprentice performing skilled work 
is half of the wage costs associated with employing a skilled worker.
8  Although unskilled work is not the goal of apprenticeship training, it can be an important element – at least 
at the beginning of the training period – for both the firm and the apprentice. For the apprentice, it does 
not matter much whether he or she learns behavioural skills, such as punctuality and precision, which are 
important in the work environment, by doing either skilled or unskilled work. What is more important is the 
fact that the apprentice has the opportunity as early as possible in the training period to learn these skills both 
effectively and efficiently. For the firms, the possibility of having apprentices doing unskilled work offers an 
opportunity to improve the cost-benefit balance. As apprentices usually need some learning time before they 
can be entrusted with skilled tasks, in the absence of the availability of unskilled tasks, the apprentices would 
be unproductive for too long, thereby increasing the net costs and risk for a firm, so that it may refrain from 
offering training positions in the first place. Therefore, using apprentices to perform unskilled tasks is not bad 
overall, but quality assurance systems are certainly needed to ensure that apprentices are not mainly used as 
cheap labour. 
Benefit components
Net benefits or 
break even
Saved hiring costs
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3) Costs that stem from external training of newly-hired workers. 
4)  Disruption costs that occur when externally hired employees interrupt the work of 
the other workers because they need instruction and help. 
All of these costs can be saved if the firm successfully fills a vacancy with an apprentice 
who was trained by the firm. 
In this study, we are not able to provide representative figures of the potential size of 
these saved hiring costs in England, as we have not had not enough observation from 
participating firms for each occupation that we analyse. However, we have had some 
indications, which we mention in the results’ section. 
The impact of the degree of loyalty to the training firm is, of course, decisive. If, as in 
Switzerland, two-thirds of the apprentices leave their training company after the end 
of training, a firm needs to train three apprentices to fill one vacancy (if the apprentices 
leave their training company voluntarily). In other words, the saved hiring costs for one 
vacancy, on average, would need to be high enough to compensate for the net costs of 
training three apprentices in Switzerland, which shows that saved hiring costs are an 
argument mainly for either (large) firms with an internal labour market or firms with 
very firm specific human capital and, therefore, also a reasonably high retention rate. 
Problems eliciting 
numbers for England
Mobility of apprentices 
after training
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In this chapter, we provide arguments for the scenarios we have used to simulate the 
costs and benefits of potential apprenticeship models from the perspective of firms. 
The scenarios are not modelled on existing English models and are, therefore, not 
evaluations of the existing apprenticeships in England.9 However, they could fit into 
the English context, and we will provide arguments for our scenarios based on the 
experiences in Switzerland. We will elaborate on certain questions, such as why the 
duration of an apprenticeship may or should differ from occupation to occupation; what 
level of payment of a salary for apprentices would guarantee firms breaking even at 
the end of the training period; and how the quality, the quantity, and the specificity of 
training that a firm provides is reflected in the hiring costs of skilled labour. We will also 
provide information on issues that do not directly relate to the cost-benefit simulations 
but to the actual outcomes, such as the selection of apprentices and the matching of 
firms and apprentices in the apprenticeship labour market. These issues relate to our 
assumptions about the parameters in the models and, thus, call for an explanation. We 
conclude this chapter with information about the sources of the data used in our study. 
1. The simulation models
We calculate the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training for three different scenarios 
(models). Model 1 comes closest to the Swiss apprenticeship model, where apprentices 
enter training at the end of compulsory schooling as an alternative to general full-time 
schooling. In Model 2, we assume that young people have completed an upper-secondary 
education and enter an apprenticeship programme as an alternative to studying at a 
university. Finally, Model 3 a one-year extension of Model 2. Again, we base Model 3 on 
the assumption that apprentices enter the programme after having completed general 
upper-secondary education. The reason for extending Model 2 is that the framework of 
Model 2 might be too rigid in two respects. First, apprentices may not be able to acquire 
the required work skills in a programme that lasts for only two years, not because of a lack 
of time spent in formal training but because of a lack of time spent practicing the learned 
skills in the workplace. Second, firms that provide (and pay for) a substantial amount of 
workplace training might not be able to break even financially within a two-year training 
period because the apprentices do not spend enough time with the firm. 
We base all our calculations regarding off-site instruction times on numbers close to Swiss, 
German, or Austrian practice (and Spanish training programmes). All the plans are set for 
9  Existing apprenticeship models have been researched in small-scale studies in the past years (e.g. Gambin and 
Hogarth, 2017) and are not representative for all models in place. Furthermore, the dynamic of apprenticeship 
models is so high that a snapshot at some particular moment would not be representative. 
Chapter overview
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a two-year programme that totals 2,000 hours of training and work experience, of which, 
depending on the occupation, approximately 1,600 to 1,700 hours are formal instruction 
in vocational schools, and the remaining hours are work experience in a firm. In Model 
1, we assume that the training plan for the off-site education covers not only vocational 
skills but also some general skills, e.g. maths or foreign languages, that are necessary 
not only as a foundation to learn other skills but also to be able to progress further in 
the educational system after an apprenticeship. In Models 2 and 3, we assume that the 
individuals acquired all of the necessary general skills before entering the apprenticeship 
programme and that the provider of education covers mostly vocational skills. 
The detailed assumptions in the three models for which we calculate the costs and 
benefits are as follows (see Table 1 for an overview).
In Model 1, we propose a training duration of three years, which is the minimum duration 
of many apprenticeship programmes in Switzerland for the training occupations for 
which we calculate the net costs in England. This model would be most appropriate for 
school-leavers after compulsory schooling (at the age of 16), who, similar to the German-
speaking countries, would follow apprenticeships programme instead of pursuing other 
full-time schooling options.10 The curricula used in the German-speaking countries, 
therefore, also leaves room for learning general skills, such as mathematics and foreign 
languages. Therefore, to follow a Swiss training programme as closely as possible, we 
make the following assumptions: Of the approximately 1,600 hours learning vocational 
skills, 600 hours are delegated to firms and are taught by in-firm trainers, which 
corresponds to approximately five hours of instruction time per week spent at the firm 
(which comes close to the Swiss average). The rationale for delegating a considerable 
part of the vocational programme to firms is as follows: Depending on the technologies 
used in the trained occupation, the quality of in-firm training should be superior to the 
same training in a vocational school, as firms are usually at the forefront of technological 
developments. Moreover, the public authorities experience substantial savings if they do 
not need to buy expensive machinery and tools for vocational schools. Such a situation is 
also beneficial for apprentices, as they have the opportunity to use the most up-to-date 
equipment in firms. An additional benefit of in-firm training is the fact that, on most 
occasions, the training in firms is 1-to-1 teaching, whereas in schools, the same skills 
are not taught individually but rather in a class of up to 20 or more students. Given the 
nature of some skills, practical exercises are often necessary to become proficient; thus, 
the instruction of one apprentice (or a very small group) by one trainer in a firm seems to 
be much more appropriate than training a full class.11 
10  The four main explanations in support of an “early” apprenticeship programme are, first, that school-leavers, 
when confronted with another three years or more of general schooling and, therefore, with the risk of 
dropping out of the educational system after compulsory schooling, are more likely to remain in the education 
system. Switzerland, which has one of the highest completion rates of upper-secondary education in the 
industrialised world (OECD, 2017a), shows that this strategy can be successful in reducing early educational 
dropouts. Second, at a young age, and when still living with their parents, an apprentice’s pay can be lower 
than that required for older students, and even a small amount of pay compares favourably relative to the 
prospect of not earning anything when attending a full-time school programme. Third, training firms like 
to take in apprentices at a younger age because they can be socialised more easily to the work and to firm 
requirements and realities. Finally, working together with adults and being tutored by older apprentices in a 
real-life environment stimulates the learning motivation of young adults and leads to better learning outcomes 
for those who may have problems with self-motivation in a school environment. 
11  Often, 1-to-1 teaching in firms is the standard case, as many training firms only train one apprentice at time. 
Larger firms usually train more than one apprentice in the same occupation and the same training year and 
have the opportunity to group apprentices where both possible and necessary, which explains why larger firms 
can have economies of scale when training apprentices. 
Model 1
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The 600 hours of vocational education obtained away from school, however, is then 
replaced by an equivalent amount of time of general education, again taught in 
vocational schools.12 Thus, the amount of time spent in school remains the same 
(approximately 1,600 hours), but it is now spread over three years. Additionally, the 
apprentice receives the 600 hours of formal vocational instruction in a firm, such that 
the firm spends approximately 5 hours of instruction time per apprentice for every week 
that the apprentice is not in school – leading to a total of approximately 2,200 hours of 
formal instruction time over three years. The rest of the time in the firm is used for both 
working and practicing and thereby providing not only a financial return for the training 
firm but also a private return for apprentices by acquiring additional on-the-job skills 
through informal learning. 
Conversely, Model 2 targets approximately 18-year-old individuals who already hold 
a general upper-secondary qualification and would, therefore, not need to spend more 
time in general education during an apprenticeship. Similar to Model 1, apprentices 
receive a total of 1,000 hours of formal (non-general) education in vocational school, 
and the remaining 600–700 hours of formal instruction takes place in the firms, leading 
to a total of 1,600 hours of formal vocational instruction. It is important to note here 
that, while firms training apprentices in Switzerland also believe that an apprentice 
can either learn while working or is working while learning, there are legal obligations 
in Switzerland that apprentices receive a minimal amount of formal in-firm teaching. 
The time spent in the firm is, therefore, not merely learning by doing. In this spirit, in 
all three models, we calculate, for the delegated hours of formal training from schools 
to firms, the costs of having an in-firm trainer spending his or her time educating the 
apprentices theoretically and practically. Firms are expected to provide their part of the 
training at their own cost, but at the same time, they have the opportunity to train the 
apprentices in their technologies and business processes and thereby save expensive 
adaptation costs compared with hiring someone either directly from school or from the 
external labour market. The apprentices would again, as in Model 1, spend the rest of 
their time at the firms working and practicing, thereby not only acquiring additional 
vocational skills through informal learning but also acquiring work-related social skills. 
Finally, Model 3 is identical to Model 2 in the first two years of training, but it contains 
an additional third year. In Model 2, while apprentices accumulate all the required 
formal human capital in the first two years, relatively little time remains for productive 
work in the firm. Thus, for many occupations, firms will not find Model 2 profitable. 
Moreover, while apprentices acquire substantial theoretical knowledge, firms may 
want to provide additional general and specific training so that their apprentices can 
successfully perform the required skilled tasks for the firm. For this and other reasons, 
apprenticeship programmes in the German-speaking countries last for at least three 
years and even for four years (3.5 years in Germany) in practically all the technical 
occupations in Switzerland. Even if we assume that – contrary to Swiss apprentices – 
12  The 600 hours of general schooling in firms is not equivalent to what a student would acquire when attending 
an upper-secondary school in general education and, therefore, is not enough to qualify to enter a general 
education programme in higher education. However, given the extensive amount of vocational training, the 
student would certainly qualify for professional education programmes at the level of tertiary education. 
The same is true in the case of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Therefore, in the case of Switzerland, 
for example, apprentices have the opportunity to spend an extra year on general education either during 
the apprenticeship or after the apprenticeship, which can then lead to a professional baccalaureate. This 
certification allows students to continue their studies at a university of applied sciences. If, however, they want 
to transfer to a classical, academic university, they would have to attend another year of general education. 
General education 
in school
Model 2
Model 3 as an extension 
of Model 2
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English apprentices would enter training with an already completed general education 
at the upper-secondary level, two years of vocational training would be too little time to 
learn the necessary vocational skills and attain the performance level of a fully trained 
skilled worker, if the expected skill levels for skilled employees should be comparable 
to those of Continental European workers. In the additional year that the apprentices 
spend in training (compared with Model 2), they receive the equivalent amount of formal 
in-firm training as an apprentice in an average Swiss firm in a comparable training 
occupation (approximately 200 hours on average). Moreover, an apprentice could work 
and continue to practise for approximately 1,500–1,600 hours in the last year of training, 
thereby also accumulating important vocational and professional skills.
table 1   Assumptions of the baseline simulation models for net training costs in England
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
three years of training two years of training three years of training
1,600 hours formal education in 
vocational schools 
1,000 hours formal education in 
vocational school 
the first two years as in model 2 
approx. five hours per week 
of formal training for each 
apprentice (approx.. 600 hours in 
total) + workplace experience
approx. 600 hours of formal 
workplace education + workplace 
experience
in the third year, firms provide 
formal workplace training similar 
to a Swiss firm in a comparable 
training occupation (approx. 200 
hours on average)
Total amount of formal school 
and firm training: approx. 2,200 
hours
Total amount of formal school 
and firm training: approx. 1,600 
hours
Total amount of formal school 
and firm training: approx. 1,800 
hours
2. Parameters and further assumptions
Apprentices’ wages
In countries with an apprenticeship tradition, firms pay apprentices’ wages in every 
month of the training period, irrespective of whether the apprentice is working for the 
firm or attending vocational school. Conversely, in countries where work experience 
is viewed as complementary to a predominantly school-based vocational education, 
apprentices are usually only paid for the duration of the time spent as an intern at the 
firm. While being at the firm in the latter form of training mainly serves the purpose 
of acquiring work experience, the wage level during these months is usually also higher 
than is the average apprentice’s salary in the classical apprenticeship model. Thus, 
one could consider that the two models of paying apprentices are roughly equivalent, 
meaning that paying less over a longer period equals paying more over a shorter period. 
However, even if the total value in terms of cash payments to the apprentices is the 
same in both payment schemes, there may be important differences not directly related 
to apprentices’ pay.
In particular, paying an apprentice a salary for the whole duration of a training 
programme radically changes the nature of the relationship between the firm and the 
apprentice in many ways. The changed nature of this relationship becomes visible 
before the apprentice starts working for the firm. When a firm is paying an apprentice 
a monthly salary in each month of the training period, the apprentice is considered to 
Two models of  
apprentice pay
Monthly pay = better 
matching
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be a regular employee. Employees are recruited and hired by firms and not by schools. 
In addition to other benefits, this recruitment has a positive impact on the matching of 
firms and apprentices, both in terms of quality and quantity. In quantitative terms, if 
many school leavers would like to obtain training in occupation A, but firms would rather 
hire apprentices in occupation B, then letting the firms recruit apprentices would lead 
to more training in occupation B. Conversely, in a school-driven system, schools would 
have an incentive to offer (too) many training places in occupation A, thus creating a 
mismatch in the labour market later on. Concerning the match quality, allowing firms 
to recruit their apprentices at the beginning of the training period provides incentives 
to firms to pay attention to the individual match and to select suitable candidates from 
the pool of applicants. In the school-driven model, even if there was no mismatch in 
quantitative terms, it may be the case that the firms would have selected different 
apprentices than those that the schools have allowed into their training programmes. 
As a result, when subsequently confronted with a pool of potential interns, the firms are 
no longer willing to offer internships, despite having vacant training places (for suitable 
candidates). 
Moreover, the fact that the apprentice is responsible to the firm from the moment he 
or she has signed the training (and work) contract is crucial. Even if the apprentice 
spends most of his or her time in school at the beginning of the training period, the 
firm has the right to monitor the educational progress of the apprentice and intervene 
if necessary. For the schools, the employer replaces the parents and becomes the 
main contact person, and employers ensure that the content and quality of the school 
instruction matches their expectations. The employee–employer relationship in this 
type of apprenticeship also has a positive impact on the apprentices’ motivation and 
loyalty to the training company.
Finally, but also important, if the firm pays the apprentice a monthly salary that is 
somewhat lower than that it would pay an intern, the firm also must recognise that 
the apprentice is not at the firm solely to work but is also entitled to receive formal 
instruction and training during the entire training period.
In Switzerland, there are no binding minimum wages, and apprentices are paid 
irrespective of whether they are in the firm – if they are in the firm they receive a 
monthly wage, irrespective of whether they either work or practise. In England, we 
have to take into account the fact that apprentices and youth are entitled to minimum 
hourly wages.13 The main assumptions are the following: In Model 1, we assume that 
apprentices are under the age of 19 and are always paid the apprentice minimum wage 
of £3.50 per hour. In Models 2 and 3, we assume that firms pay the apprentices the 
apprentice minimum wage of £3.50 per hour in the first year of apprenticeship and £7.05 
per hour in the second and third (Model 3) years. The minimum wage for the second and 
third years depends on the age bracket that the apprentice is in. We took the wage as 
being that for youths aged 21–24, which should correspond to the average age of older 
apprentices. For all models, we then calculated low- and high-wage scenarios. Common 
to both scenarios, apprentices do not receive the hourly wage either when in school or 
when on holiday. This is different for Swiss apprentices with monthly wages, but we 
assume that a compensation for holidays is already factored into the hourly minimum 
13  We have used the national minimum wages in place in 2017: https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-
rates
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27
the Simulation model, data, and aSSumPtionS on the ParameterS
wage. In the low-wage scenario, firms pay the hourly wage only if the apprentice is 
used for productive work, which means that, if a firm either sends the apprentices to 
additional external courses or lets the apprentice practise, it does not have to pay the 
hourly wage. In the high-wage scenario, we assume that the firm must pay the hourly 
wage, irrespective of whether the apprentice works or practises, and that absences from 
the workplace that have been ordered by the firm count as working time. 
These assumptions lead to the following patterns of apprentices’ wages: The average 
hourly wages are different from model to model both because of the level of hourly 
wages and because we assume different numbers of school days per year in each of the 
model. In the high-wage scenario, the apprentices are paid the same average wage per 
model across all occupations, whereas, in the low-wage scenario, the wages differ by 
occupation in each of the models, as the number of external days mandated by the firms 
and the amount of time used for practising differ from occupation to occupation. 
Of course, guaranteeing a functioning apprenticeship market not only requires firms to 
break-even but also to be attractive to potential apprentices. Therefore, we decided to 
simulate the impact of these different wage scenarios on the private rates of return to 
training for the apprentices (see chapter 6). 
In these simulations, the salaries in absolute values are the same across occupations. 
In reality, this would hardly be the case. In Switzerland, individual firms set the 
apprentices’ pay; therefore, apprentices earn very different wages, depending on the 
firm and the occupation for which they are trained. Apprentice pay may even depend 
on individual productivity (see Backes–Gellner and Oswald 2014), and many firms offer 
apprentices performance-based salaries. Therefore, we complement our analyses with 
the calculation of break-even salaries. The break-even salary corresponds to the salary 
that a firm would be able to pay an apprentice if the goal is to have zero net-costs by 
the end of the training period. Although firms who expect an additional benefit after 
training could even pay a higher wage than the break-even wage, this wage gives a good 
indication of the differences between sectors and occupations and demonstrates that 
a uniform apprentice wage is not efficient in either absolute terms or relative terms 
(relative to the occupation specific skilled wage). 
“Fair pay”
Regarding relative wages for apprentices (relative to skilled or unskilled workers), it 
is quite common for legislators and social partners to set arbitrarily ratios that they 
consider to be a fair wage. The problem with these ratios is that they are usually based 
on the assumption that apprentices primarily work and that learning either takes place 
before the apprenticeship or is just learning by doing. In other words, the so-called 
“fair-pay” assumes that firms do not have extra training expenditures. In doing so, 
legislators and social partners often overlook the fact that setting ratios in this way 
actually pushes firms that are interested in training apprentices to reduce their training 
expenditures to a minimum. Therefore, we propose to calculate “fair pay” as the relative 
wage that a firm can pay an apprentice conditional to the expenditures that the firm 
must make to ensure high standards of training. These wage levels correspond to the 
break-even wages that we have simulated for all scenarios, models, and occupations.
Consequences of  
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Performance levels (relative productivity)
The advantage of our simulation model is the fact that we do not have to assume that 
the productivity levels are the same in England and in Switzerland – even though 
the occupations for which we use Swiss data are very similar to English occupations. 
Using the relative level of productivity of Swiss apprentices to Swiss skilled workers 
as an indication of the learning progress of English apprentices merely assumes that 
English firms would be able to train their apprentices in such a way that they would 
progress in relation to English expectations (i.e. the productivity level of skilled workers 
in England), just as is in the case in Switzerland. The relative measure also has the 
advantage that differences in productivity between either firms or regions that are 
reflected in the differences in salaries for skilled labour are taken into account through 
the salary level. Firms operating at lower productivity levels can only afford to pay lower 
salaries; consequently, the benefit in monetary terms of the work of an apprentice is 
also lower. However, we assume – as observed in the Swiss, German, and Austrian data 
– that the apprentices reach comparable levels of relative productivity, irrespective of 
the absolute level of productivity in a given firm or occupation (Dionisious et al., 2009; 
Moretti et al., 2017). In other words, a firm trains apprentices with the aim of reaching 
the same productivity level with that apprentice as the firm has with a skilled worker. 
Although the differences in absolute productivity between Swiss and English firms in 
the same economic sector are not important for our calculations, we need to address 
one potential source of bias. A bias can occur if the competition between the school 
system and the apprenticeship system is such that the school system has an advantage 
in attracting the more-talented and higher-motivated students, thereby leaving the 
apprenticeship training system with the less-talented and less-motivated students. In 
such a situation, firms may decide not to train at all and to wait for the students to leave 
college or university and then offer them an internship instead of a formal dual training 
programme. For firms that still wish to offer a dual programme to the available applicants, 
such a situation would generate higher net costs, because either the productivity levels 
of the apprentices would be lower than the comparable Swiss situation or firms would 
have to spend more money on internal training to reach comparable productivity levels 
– or both (see, e.g. Muehlemann et al., 2013). In other words, we base our calculations 
on the assumption that English firms would be able to attract apprentices into their 
programmes who are similarly able to those attracted by Swiss firms today. 
Thus, for the three-year programmes (Models 1 and 3), we assume that the levels of 
relative productivity exactly correspond to the levels observed in similar three-year 
programmes in Switzerland. In Model 2, we calculate a lower bound for the net costs of 
training and assume that the progress in relative productivity between year 1 and year 2 
corresponds to the progress made by a Swiss apprentice between year 1 and year 3 of the 
training period. One argument that could support this assumption is that, unlike Swiss 
apprentices, the typical English apprentice in these programmes would have already 
graduated from upper-secondary school. 
Given that the true level of productivity of apprentices in England is not only difficult 
to forecast but that there would also be a natural and likely considerable heterogeneity 
between apprentices and training firms, we always complement our simulations with 
sensitivity checks on different levels of relative productivity of apprentices. Thus, we 
Using relative 
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can at least simulate whether deviations from our parameters that correspond to the 
Swiss averages would lead to sizeable changes in the net costs of training. 
Dropout rates
In many countries, mainly due to a negative selection of students into work-based 
training programmes, but sometimes also because of either the poor quality or the 
bad reputation of programmes, firms face high dropout rates. Dropouts can also be a 
consequence of the duration of training programmes. If a long duration is not necessary 
to acquire the skills required to be a professional in the occupation, apprentices have 
a higher tendency to drop out prematurely.14 These dropouts may have a negative 
impact on the firms’ willingness to provide future training places, not only because of 
reputational costs but also because firms cannot recoup their training investments if 
apprentices dropout too early. To calculate the potential additional costs of providing 
training places caused by dropouts, we simulate the impact of dropout rates of 25 % and 
50 % of apprentices after the first year of the programme. In other words, if training one 
apprentice successfully in the full programme also means also training an additional 
apprentice unsuccessfully for one year, the potential costs of this additional apprentice 
must either be added to the costs for the successful apprentice or, in the case of net-
benefits, be deducted from the net-benefits. The reason we are writing about potential 
costs is the following: dropouts generate additional costs only in programmes where 
apprentices cause net-costs in the first year of training. If, however, the training scheme 
allows the firm to cover the training investments very quickly with the productive 
contribution of the apprentices, dropouts might even either increase the net-benefit 
or reduce the net-costs of the overall programme. Although, in the latter case, the firm 
has an incentive to discontinue the training if problems arise, the firm would still face 
the reputational costs of high dropout rates, which, in turn, would reduce the chances 
of attracting good apprentices in the first place. 
Increases in skilled wages
For some of the occupations in our simulations, although not for all of them, the 
intensity of training and education in our models exceeds considerably the standards in 
place today. If this additional training leads to an increase in productivity, which is the 
purpose of extensive training, we should also see the value-added and, in consequence, 
the wages of these skilled employees rise above the levels observed in the English labour 
market today. For this reason, we also simulate models where we assume that the 
extensive training schemes lead to an increase in skilled salaries by 10 %. All other things 
equal (Ceteris paribus), this additional assumption would lead automatically to lower net-
costs of training (and higher private rates of return to education) due to the value of the 
skilled work which the apprentices are going to substitute increasing and, therefore, 
their productive contribution to the firm being greater. However, in the end, we also 
have to assume that, if extensive training creates employees who are more productive 
and the substitution of these employees generates a higher value-added for the firm, 
then the costs of training will also increase because more productive and, therefore, 
better-paid employees must spend their working hours training the apprentices. 
14  Nafilyan and Speckesser (2017), in their evaluation of the 2012 apprenticeship reform in England that changed 
the minimum duration of apprenticeships, estimate that, although the extension of the duration led to higher 
productivity and wages of the apprentices, it also increased the dropout rates by 3–5 %. 
Dropouts may cause 
additional costs
Higher productivity = 
higher wages
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Altogether, it is, therefore, not clear from the outset whether apprenticeships become 
less costly or even more costly for firms in the period of training. It is a question of 
whether the productive contribution of apprentices increases by either more or less 
than the training expenditures do, and this might differ from occupation to occupation. 
Other expenditures
In addition to training expenditures and other personnel costs, as well as the 
apprentices’ salaries, firms that train apprentices also incur other costs, e.g. for tools, 
spare materials, and machines, that they have to buy either for the purpose of training 
or that are not used exclusively for production when being used by apprentices for 
training. While personnel costs and apprentices’ wages can be calculated using UK 
wage data, expenditures for tools or machinery in Switzerland are difficult to transform 
to the English context because the price level is different between the two countries. 
Therefore, we assume that the remaining expenditures, other than personnel costs 
and apprentices’ salaries, correspond to the same share of these costs in terms of a 
skilled worker’s salary in Switzerland. Although there is a certain amount of uncertainty 
attached to this assumption, the impact on our simulations is limited, as personnel costs 
and apprentices’ wages already constitute between 85 % and 90 % of the total gross costs 
of training in Switzerland. 
Costs for off-site education and training
In the German-speaking countries, off-site training and education is usually provided 
by public schools and fully paid for by the state. In other words, firms do not face direct 
costs for the education and training provided by schools but must, of course, factor 
in additional absences of apprentices from the work place, which means less time for 
productive work for the firm. For this reason, it is not always clear ex ante if the training 
and education provided by schools for free either decreases or increases the net-costs of 
training for firms. As a rule of thumb, one can say that, if the training provided by schools 
for free would have to be provided in any case to attain the expected levels of skills and 
productivity, the public provision lowers the net-costs of training for firms. However, if 
some or much of the content learned in school does not translate immediately to higher 
productivity of the apprentices, the additional absences from the workplace create 
additional training net-costs for the firm. Because of the complex interplay of factors, 
one can easily understand why firms in countries with well-developed apprenticeship 
systems sometimes resist the transfer of training and education to off-site providers, 
while, in other instances, they lobby for more training and education to be taken over 
by the schools and paid for from the public purse. 
To make the simulations comparable not only with all the countries for which we are 
conducting simulations but also with the empirical data collected in Austria, Germany, 
and Switzerland, we assume that the off-site education is paid for by the government 
and that the training firms do not have to cover any additional costs for this part of 
the training programme. In the English context, firms receive subsidies for off-site 
education (see OECD, 2017b, p. 48). Additionally, the levy scheme, where firms with 
a pay bill of more than £3 Million15 must pay an apprenticeship levy but can, in turn, 
15  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/apprenticeship-levy-how-it-will-work/apprenticeship-levy-
how-it-will-work#pay-apprenticeship-levy; consulted 18.1.2018.
Similar to Switzerland
Public provision of school 
based education
No additional costs for 
training firms
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receive levy funds to pay for training providers is a further argument, to assume that 
the off-site education of approximately 20 % of the training time does not create extra 
costs for the training firms, as firms need to pay the levy regardless of whether they 
train apprentices. 
3. Data 
We use three major sources for the data in our simulations. 
The first source is the most recent cost-benefit survey data from Switzerland (see 
Strupler & Wolter, 2012), which collected data on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship 
training from a representative set of approximately 2,500 Swiss training firms. This 
study was the third to be conducted within one decade in Switzerland (see Schweri et 
al., 2003 and Muehlemann et al., 2007 for previous results), and the results remained 
remarkably stable over the business cycle. 
This source is used to obtain all of the necessary data regarding the following investments 
in training and the productive contributions of apprentices: The weekly number of 
training hours that a firm invests per apprentice; the number of hours spent by other 
personnel (such as HR services) involved in hiring and training apprentices; the share 
of unproductive time spent by apprentices in the firm (mainly used for practice); the 
number of hours apprentices substitute unskilled workers while in the firm; the number 
of hours apprentices substitute skilled workers while in the firm; the productivity 
levels in a given year of training relative to skilled workers in the same occupation; and, 
finally, the amount of money invested in spare material, tools and machinery and other 
expenditures related to apprenticeship training. All of the relevant data are averages for 
Swiss firms training apprentices either in the same occupation or in the occupation that 
is most similar to the English occupation. 
The second data source is wage data for the economic sectors and occupations for 
which we run our simulations in England.16 To calculate the productive contribution of 
the apprentices, we used the average wages of skilled workers in the same occupation 
in addition to the wages earned by unskilled workers in the same economic sector. 
In some sectors, the reported data show that currently, an average unskilled worker 
earns almost as much or, sometimes, as much as an average skilled worker in the same 
economic sector. The most likely explanation for this result is a difference in years of 
tenure between an average older unskilled worker and a younger skilled worker.17 In our 
simulations, when calculating the productive contribution of an apprentice performing 
unskilled labour, we assume that the value of this work is equal to what a firm would 
have to pay an average unskilled worker who it would hire today from the labour market. 
The situation would, however, be different if a firm could secure only very young people 
for unskilled jobs, as – given the wage statistics – they have to pay them less. Therefore, 
we also simulated all models assuming that all firms would be able to hire only young 
unskilled people for the specific functions. The impact of this assumption on the results 
16  The EPI provided wage data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (July–September 2016) covering the whole 
of the UK and with a sample size of 88,464 people. 
17  Furthermore, the data sometimes showed that younger workers earn more than do older workers, which may 
be due either to changes in the skill profiles over time or to selection effects.
Data sources
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is not particularly strong, but it increases the net-costs of training because it reduces 
the value of the work that the apprentice is contributing to the firm when substituting 
an unskilled person. Whereas higher wages for unskilled work have a negative impact 
on the private rates of return to education (see chapter 6), they do, in general, decrease 
the net costs of training if a firm has unskilled work that can be done by apprentices. 
However, although high wage levels for unskilled people is an incentive for firms to 
substitute these workers with apprentices, it can be detrimental for the system as such, 
as the ultimate goal of training is not to substitute unskilled workers but to be trained 
to substitute skilled workers. 
As for training and personnel expenditures, we used the salary data for skilled workers 
in the training occupation, in addition to other categories of workers (such as HR 
personnel) involved in either the training or the management of apprentices. 
We tried to collect data on hiring costs, as there are no English data available on the 
hiring costs of new workers. As the labour market situation differs considerably between 
Switzerland and England, we were also not able to use existing Swiss data for this 
purpose. The data were collected at the end of each sectorial workshop.18 Unfortunately, 
the number of questionnaires was not high enough to make any firm statements about 
hiring costs, and it was by no means representative of the whole English economy. 
Therefore, we have to refrain from reporting them in detail. 
The degree to which a firm can save on hiring costs per trained apprentice depends on 
many factors, such as the labour market situation for graduated apprentices, the loyalty 
of apprentices to the training firm, and the within-firm opportunities for apprentices. 
The experiences in Germany and Switzerland show that larger firms with internal labour 
markets have higher takeover rates than small firms and also firms with high amounts 
of firm-specific knowledge, and can, therefore expect higher savings in hiring costs. 
18  The six sectorial workshops lasted half a day each. The participants were asked to validate the assumptions used 
for these simulations and had the possibility of checking the impact of alternative assumptions and parameters 
on the net-costs of training. The research team was present in the workshop with the computer-based tool to 
calculate the net-costs to make additional simulations on the spot. 
Other personnel 
categories
Hiring costs
Big firms have higher 
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5  Simulating net training costs –  
a detailed analysis
In this chapter, we illustrate the simulations of the costs and benefits of various training 
models in detail for the occupation of a car mechanic and provide additional descriptive 
statistics. We present all detailed results of the other nine training occupations (but 
without further explanations) in the appendix.
1)  We estimate the net training costs for all three baseline models, as outlined in the 
previous chapter (Chapter 4) for this occupation. 
2)  We provide a sensitivity analysis regarding the productivity of apprentices relative 
to skilled workers at the beginning of an apprenticeship. Thus, we show how the net 
training costs change when we allow for different assumptions of the productivity 
parameter. 
3)  We present a break-even analysis for trainee pay, showing at what level of monthly 
apprentices pay a firm could offer apprenticeship training at zero net costs. 
4)  We discuss how net costs vary by firm size, as large firms typically offer higher wages, 
particularly for skilled workers. 
5)  We show how different dropout rates affect the net costs of training. 
6)  We show the impact of a 10 % wage increase of skilled labour on the net costs of 
training. 
Net training costs for apprentices 
When looking at the results for the three baseline models (see Table 2) with two different 
apprentice pay scenarios, it becomes immediately clear that, from the firm’s perspective, 
net training costs vary greatly not only due to the different apprentices’ wages but also 
between the different scenarios. While net training costs are higher than £ 12,000 in the 
high-wage scenario in Model 3, a firm can expect to generate a net benefit of around £ 500 
from training an apprentice according to the same Model 3 in the low-wage scenario. The 
differences of the outcomes between the wage scenarios are easily understandable, but 
the differences between the models when switching between the different wage scenarios 
need explanations. Model 3 is as good as the other case in the low-wage scenario, but the 
net costs are double for Models 1 or 2 in the high-wage scenario. The reasons for this 
increase in Model 3 in the high-wage scenario compared to Model 1 lie in the fact that in 
the third year, the apprentice has no absences anymore due to off-site education, and 
Chapter overview
Pay level matters most
34
Simulating net training CoStS – a detailed analySiS 
these absences do not need to be paid according to our assumptions. At the wage level of 
some £ 7.05 an hour, however, the productive contribution is not high enough to cover 
the costs of the additional 200 hours of on-site training. In this case, the apprentice pay 
exceeds the ‘fair-wage’, and therefore, the extension of the apprenticeship duration does 
not generate a possibility for the firm to make an extra benefit and lower the net costs 
(compared to Model 2) but increases the net costs. Although Model 1 has also a duration 
of 3 years, it does not increase the net costs significantly compared to Model 2, because 
apprentices earn half the pay in year three compared to Model 3. 
table 2  Net training costs – Car mechanic England
Wage level Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Low wage scenario –653 –330 –524
High wage scenario 6,790 6,018 12,067
Source: own calculations
Although we were not able to get representative data on the costs of hiring a new car 
mechanic, we obtained evidence from the workshop that firms training car mechanics 
face substantial hiring costs if they have to hire a skilled worker on the labour market. 
Besides the usual recruitment costs, and in particular due to car brand specific 
technologies, the hiring firm would need to partially retrain the hired mechanic. In 
Switzerland, an average firm across all occupations faces hiring costs between 2 and 
4 monthly wages of a skilled worker but needs to train on average three apprentices 
to retain one. If, as a rule of thumb, we assumed that average English firms are in a 
similar situation, and the hiring costs equal up to four monthly salaries, but retention 
rates are a little bit higher than in Switzerland (50 %), then the hiring costs would not be 
sufficient to offset the net costs of any of the training Models in the high-wage scenario 
completely. However, this additional benefit would help firms to almost break even in 
Models 1 and 2 in the high-wage scenario. If, due to brand-specific training, firms were 
able to retain all their apprentices, saved hiring costs would on average even come close 
to covering the net costs observed in Model 3. However, it also becomes evident that if 
firms faced high turnover rate of apprentices after training, these additional benefits 
would disappear immediately. 
The net training costs also evolve over time (seeFigure 1): In the first year of training, 
costs usually surpass benefits; in the second year, the firm breaks even; and in the third 
year, a net benefit arises. This is a rather usual pattern and mainly the consequence of 
rising productivity of the apprentice over time. Although the apprentice earns a fixed 
£ 3.50 per hour, the costs of training also rise over time. This is a consequence of our 
pay assumptions in the low-wage scenario, in which we assume that firms do not need 
to pay apprentices when they are practicing or sent to external courses. As this happens 
more frequently in the first year of training, this lowers the wage costs in the first year 
substantially, while in the third year, the apprentice spends more working on site, and 
therefore, the wage bill rises as well. However, because the benefits rise more quickly 
than the costs, the third year of the apprenticeship helps the firms to break even by the 
end of the training period. These are the results for Model 1 in the low-wage scenario. In 
the high-wage scenarios, the firms face net costs in each year of the program resulting 
in substantial net costs at the end of the training period. 
Substantial potential 
savings in hiring costs
Net costs evolution
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figure 1   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training –  
Car mechanic England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low wage scenario)
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In our model, the trainee wage level is constant for each year of training in Model 1 but 
increases over time due to fewer absences from the workplace, and the pay level even 
doubles for year two and three in Models 2 and 3. This is quite similar to actual patterns 
of wages observable in other countries, where apprentice pay is typically lower at the 
beginning of an apprenticeship and increases over time (Strupler and Wolter 2012). This 
also leads to a situation in which the apprentices are often absent from the firm when 
wages are lower and their productivity in skilled tasks is still very low (e.g., in digressive 
vocational school system models, where apprentices spend more time in school at the 
beginning of an apprenticeship). Therefore, when apprentices spend more time at the 
workplace towards the end of the training period, not only are their wages higher but 
also is their productive contribution, which in most cases leads to net benefits in the 
second half of the apprenticeship period. 
Instruction time at the workplace, another important cost component, does not vary in 
our model across the different years of training. The reason for this assumption lies in 
the observation that the instruction time in Swiss firms varies very little in the different 
years of an apprenticeship program.
As apprentices become more experienced in difficult tasks, usually performed by skilled 
workers, firms also allocate a higher fraction of such tasks to apprentices relative to 
unskilled tasks. Figure 2 shows the composition of training benefits by training year 
stemming from apprentices substituting skilled and unskilled workers. While almost all 
the training benefits are due to low-skilled tasks in the first year of training, only half 
of these benefits result from high-skilled tasks in the third year of training. The shares 
of the training benefits that one can attribute to low- or high-skilled tasks, however, do 
not correspond to the shares of time devoted to these different tasks. When high-skilled 
More time at the 
workplace increases costs
Costs of instruction time
Sources of benefits
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tasks are very difficult to perform, the productivity of the apprentices is low compared to 
that of the experienced staff. If the wage levels for unskilled workers relative to skilled 
workers are rather high, then the share of benefits accruing from low-skilled tasks may 
still surpass the share coming from high-skilled tasks even if the firm uses apprentices 
predominantly for skilled tasks. 
figure 2  Composition of training benefits by year of training – Car mechanic England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low wage scenario).
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figure 3  Composition of gross training costs – Car mechanic England
Source: own calculations, based on Model 1 (€300 monthly apprentice pay).
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Regarding the components of the gross training costs, Figure 3 shows that most training 
costs are in fact wage costs for apprentices and training instructors. In the case of Model 
1, apprentice wage costs account for 30 % of total training costs. Conversely, the costs for 
instruction at the workplace amount to 52 % of total training costs, leaving less than 20 % 
for other expenditures, such as infrastructure or materials used for training purposes. In 
Model 2 (again in the low cost scenario), the shares of apprentice pay and training costs 
would be almost equal (and come close to the Swiss case), and in Model 3, the share of 
apprentice pay (48 %) would exceed the share of training costs (39 %), and the shares for 
other costs would drop to 14 %. 
Sensitivity analysis of apprentice productivity
The purpose of training for the apprentices is to get hired as skilled workers at the end 
of their training period by either the training firm or an outside firm. In order to learn 
the necessary skills, they must not only follow a theoretical education but also be able 
to practice skilled work during their training. The benefit created for the firm by letting 
apprentices substitute skilled workers depends crucially on the relative performance 
(productivity) of apprentices compared to skilled workers. As we cannot directly 
measure the productivity of English apprentices, we use the levels of productivity of 
Swiss apprentices in our calculations. Thus, our estimates rely on the assumption that 
the relative productivity of apprentices in skilled tasks compared to experienced skilled 
workers (but not the absolute levels of productivity) would be the same for English and 
Swiss apprentices. This might be a good assumption to start with, but there are many 
reasons why in the real case of introducing a Swiss apprenticeship model in England, we 
would not see exactly the same levels of relative productivity. In Chapter 4, we described 
the factors that could either lead to higher or lower levels of relative productivity in 
England compared to Switzerland. Therefore, it is necessary to run sensitivity analyses 
in order to see by how much the net costs or net benefits of training would change if 
we deviated (+/– 10 percentage points in the first year of training19) from the Swiss 
assumptions about the relative productivity levels of apprentices. 
The net costs in Model 2 (see Figure 4) react most sensitively to changes in the 
assumption about the relative productivity of apprentices. In this model, we assume 
that, due to their prior education and advanced age, firms substitute skilled workers 
with apprentices more quickly, and apprentices in turn begin to work at higher levels of 
productivity faster. In other words, compared to Models 1 and 3, the share of unskilled 
work in the first year would be much smaller, and therefore, the impact of changes in 
the relative productivity of apprentices doing skilled work on the benefit would be much 
greater. The changes, however, are still small even in Model 2, where an apprentice is 10 
percentage points more productive relative to a skilled worker than a Swiss apprentice 
lowers the net costs by some £ 1,000 compared to one who is 10 percentage points less 
productive. For Models 1 and 3, the change is around £ 400, which should be negligible.
19  In Model 1 and 3 with a training duration of three years, we also change the second-year relative productivity 
by +/– 5 percentage points.
Cost components
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figure 4  Sensitivity analysis of apprentice productivity – Car mechanic England
Source: own calculations with low wage scenario
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Break-even analysis for apprentice pay
The break-even analysis illustrates the linear relation between the apprentice’s monthly 
wage and the firm’s net training costs, holding all other factors constant. The break-
even analysis serves the purpose of showing the salary level at which a firm would just 
have zero net costs in training apprentices. Additionally, it also helps to understand by 
how much the average apprentice pay would have to be increased or reduced if additional 
benefits or costs would accrue, although they are currently not included in our model. 
Technically, a £ 1 increase in the monthly apprentice wage leads to a £ 36 increase in net 
costs for Models 1 and 3 (36 months of training), while it results in £ 24 more net costs 
for Model 2 (24 months of training). Thus, apprentice pay is the decisive factor for a 
firm’s cost-benefit ratio, and the sensitivity of the reaction of the net costs of training 
to changes in the salary is quite high. 
The calculation of the break-even wages shows (see Figure 5) that net training costs 
would be zero for monthly pays between £ 200 (Model 1) and £ 400 (Model 3). Although 
these break-even wages are below minimum wages in the UK for young workers, it has 
to be taken into account, that the firms have to pay for training, which lowers the break-
even wages.
Break-even monthly pay 
between £ 200 and £ 400
Break-even pay below 
minimum wages
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figure 5  Break-even analysis of apprentice wage – Car mechanic England
Source: own calculations
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In relation to unskilled and skilled wages, the break-even wages (see Figure 6) would lay 
between 7 % and 20 % for each category. One can see from the calculations that, even 
relative to unskilled wages, break-even wages would need to be substantially below 
these wage levels for firms to be able to pay for their training expenditures. Taking into 
account the reflections on ‘fair pay’ (see Chapter 4, assumptions on wages), this is, 
however, not a surprise. Even if we excluded any training expenditure by the firms, a 
‘fair pay’ for an apprentice relative to a skilled worker would need to take into account 
four factors that push the ratio down. First, an apprentice is not always working because 
he/she spends some time in off-site schooling. Second, when the apprentice is at the 
firm, he/she is not always working but also needs ‘unproductive’ time to practice. Third, 
when working, the apprentices is also doing unskilled work that would be remunerated 
at a lower pay level, and most importantly, when substituting a skilled worker, the 
apprentice works on average at a productivity level of 50 % compared to a skilled worker. 
The four factors taken together easily explain why the break-even wages even in the best 
cases do not surpass 15 % of an average wage for a skilled worker. 
Break-even pay relative 
to skilled and unskilled 
wages
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figure 6   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled wages 
– Car mechanic England
Source: own calculations
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Wage structure within a firm – how net costs differ by firm size
While apprentice pay is an important cost component, the wage structure for low- 
and high-skilled workers also strongly affects the value of an apprentice’s productive 
contribution (the benefit side). The value of having an apprentice work productively for 
one hour in an unskilled or skilled activity corresponds to the unskilled or skilled wage 
(adjusted for the relative productivity of the apprentice, as discussed in Chapter 4) for a 
worker of that particular firm. Thus, the higher the pay for unskilled and skilled workers, 
the more beneficial it is for a firm to use the trainee for productive work (all other things 
equal20). Firms differ not only by wage levels (which reflect differences in the overall 
productivity of the firm) but also in respect to the ratio between unskilled and skilled 
worker pay. Hence, the latter also determines a firm’s optimal allocation of skilled and 
unskilled tasks to an apprentice. 
To illustrate this in detail, let us consider the extreme and hypothetical case where 
unskilled and skilled pays are equal. In that scenario, a firm that wants to minimise 
net training costs will have an incentive to allocate as few skilled tasks as possible to 
the apprentice, because the productivity of an apprentice in skilled tasks is lower than 
the one of a skilled worker, while an apprentice – by definition – is equally productive 
in unskilled tasks compared to an unskilled worker. However, if unskilled pay is 
much lower than skilled pay, then a firm has an incentive to allocate skilled tasks to 
20  A firm’s provision of workplace training may depend on the firm size for various reasons and not only because 
of levels and differences between unskilled and skilled wages. Looking at the Swiss data, we find that the 
differences in the training hours provided to apprentices do not vary much by firm size, and this lack of 
variation is the reason why we assume in the simulations that all other factors besides the wage structure 
remain constant across firm sizes.
Firm size matters
Incentives to use 
apprentices for 
skilled tasks
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apprentices early on, so that their productivity in these tasks increases faster. Again, 
let us consider an extreme case where the productivity of an apprentice in the last year 
of training is equal to the one of a skilled worker. In this case, the firm’s benefit from 
having the apprentice carry out the skilled tasks is simply the difference in hourly pay 
between the skilled worker and the apprentice, and by assuming that the skilled wage 
is higher than the unskilled wage, a firm will have no incentive at all to use apprentices 
for unskilled tasks anymore. 
Looking at the UK wage data, we observe that the wage level in small firms is generally 
lower than in large firms, as it is the case in almost all countries. Moreover, the 
differences between skilled and unskilled pay is typically bigger in large firms. While 
unskilled workers also earn a little bit more in large firms compared to small firms, 
the firm size wage premium is typically higher for skilled workers than for unskilled 
workers.
As we assume in our simulations that firms pay the same apprentice pay irrespective of 
their size, the biggest impact on net costs comes from the differences in the absolute 
levels of pay and not so much from the relative pay of unskilled and skilled workers 
within a firm. The differences in pay levels between firms of the same sector but of 
different sizes lead to the result (see Figure 7) that very small garages training car 
mechanics have to encounter net costs in all three training models, even in the case 
of the low-wage scenario, whereas bigger firms can expect substantial net benefits. In 
reality, bigger firms usually do not pay the same apprentices’ salaries as small firms, and 
this can lead to smaller differences in the net costs of training. However, the simulation 
shows that bigger firms have a scope to pay higher salaries for apprentices and thereby 
attract more talented youth. 
figure 7  Net costs by firm size – Car mechanic England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low wage scenario)
N
et
 T
ra
in
in
g 
C
o
st
s 
(in
 p
o
u
n
d
s)
Firm Size
–12,000
–10,000
–8,000
–6,000
–4,000
–2,000
0
2,000
4,000
500+50–49911–491–10
Model 3Model 2Model 1
Skills premium higher  
for big firms
Big firms could expect  
net benefits
42
Simulating net training CoStS – a detailed analySiS 
Conversely, very small firms would need to stick to the low pay scenario if they do not 
want to risk losing money in training apprentices. Additionally, very small firms face 
a higher risk of losing their trainees after the training period and therefore cannot 
factor in additional benefits after training. Although big firms could easily run a Swiss-
type apprenticeship model given the UK wage structures, micro21 firms would have 
difficulties doing so. 
Finally, we analyze what impact apprentice dropouts would have on the net costs of 
training of one successful apprentice after the first year of training. Figure 8 compares 
our basic scenario with a zero dropout rate to calculations where every fourth (25 %) or 
every second (50 %) apprentice would quit the training program after the first year for 
Model 1 with low pay and for training Model 2 with high pay. Because in our simulations 
the training firm faces net costs after the first year, such dropout rates would increase 
the overall net costs per successful apprentice. If for every successful candidate, the firm 
had to train an unsuccessful one for one year, this would turn the small net benefit into 
net costs in Model 1 in the low-cost scenario, and increase net costs by more than £ 1,500 
in the case of the high-pay scenario and training Model 2. As one can see, the additional 
costs training firms have to face in the case of dropouts depend on the training model, 
the net cost pattern over time, and most of all on the pay level for apprentices, and such 
costs can be substantial. 
Besides the financial costs that dropouts generate for training firms, there would 
certainly also be a negative psychological factor affecting the willingness to train and, 
as mentioned before, a reputational damage to take into account. 
figure 8  Changes in net-costs assuming different dropout rates – Car mechanic England
Source: own calculations
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Observing that all wage scenarios (low, high, and break-even) assume apprenticeship 
wages that are only a small fraction of unskilled and skilled wages, a question arises as to 
whether training is worthwhile for the apprentices at such levels of apprentice pay. The 
lower the pay during the training period and the longer the duration of the apprenticeship 
program, the higher the wage differential between the unskilled and the skilled wage 
must be for the rest of the working life to generate a positive return to education. 
Calculations of the returns to education are quite frequent (see Cavaglia et al. 2017 
for a recent example of calculations of private rates of return to education for English 
apprenticeship programs). Although we are using real labour market data on UK 
wages in this study, we need to simulate these rates of return to education because 
these calculations should mirror our assumptions in the cost-benefit simulations for 
firms. In other words, we need to simulate whether apprentices can expect positive 
returns to education if they follow an apprenticeship as designed in our models and 
are paid the apprentices wage as assumed in the cost-benefit simulations for firms. 
The results shown in Table 3 use the break-even wages calculated for all models and 
occupations. In the break-even scenario, firms would not incur net costs after training 
and would therefore not need to rely on additional benefits after training. Thus it is most 
interesting to see whether scenarios that are attractive for firms to offer apprenticeships 
are also attractive for potential apprentices. 
For the calculations of the rates of return to education for apprentices, we need to make a 
couple of additional assumptions. According to one assumption, the alternative wage for 
a young person who chooses to forego an apprenticeship would be the wage for unskilled 
personnel in the same economic sector as the apprenticeship. A stronger assumption, 
however, is that we use the current wage levels of skilled people as the expected wages 
after training. We chose to use this assumption as a lower bound for our calculations, 
presuming that a student facing the decision to start an apprenticeship does not use the 
current wage levels observed for trained workers as the benchmark in his/her decision 
process. We could, of course, assume that if English apprentices were trained similarly to 
Swiss apprentices, their levels of productivity would increase compared to workers in the 
same occupations in England today and they would earn a skill premium. For the firms – 
as described above – changes in the assumptions influencing the impact of training on 
skilled wages do not alter the net costs of training much, whereas for the apprentices, 
such increases would translate directly in higher rates of return to education. However, 
we cannot know by how much the productivity of apprentices would rise in reality or 
how such increases would translate into higher salaries for skilled workers. For these 
reasons, we chose to stick with the conservative assumption that, in the short run, wage 
levels for skilled people would not change.
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The calculations were made by using the average salaries per occupation and sector 
for skilled and unskilled workers. We transform these averages into lifetime earning 
streams with a convex shape using information about the impact of experience (and 
experience squared) from so-called Mincer earnings regressions (e.g., Polachek 2008). 
We thus assume that wages increase steeply in the first years of working life, flatten 
in the middle, and may even decrease towards the retirement. We then calculate the 
interest rate that would be needed to equalise the income stream for the unskilled and 
the skilled person for each of the occupations and models. 
The rates of return to education differ between the models not only because of 
differences in the apprentice pay but also because in Model 1 we assume that apprentices 
start their apprenticeship directly after finishing lower secondary education and earn 
the skilled wage afterwards till the end of their working life. Conversely, in Model 2 and 
3 the apprentices would spend an additional three years in upper-secondary education 
(without pay), which shortens the time available to earn the skilled wage. Rates of 
return to education differ between the occupation mainly because of the different skill 
premium observed today on the UK labour market and, to a small extent, because of 
different break-even wages paid during the apprenticeship. 
From the empirical literature, we know that most people have rates of time preference 
above 5 %. In other words, they prefer an instant reward to a later payment, even if the 
later comes with a surplus of 5 %. Reading the results in Table 3, we therefore interpret 
rates of return to education that do not exceed 5 % as critical (numbers in bold in table 
3), because these rates of return to education would most probably be too small to attract 
average students. 
table 3  Rates of return to education in percent – break-even wage scenario for firms
Occupations Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Bricklayers 19 % 11 % 9 %
Car mechanics 13 % 9 % 7 %
Care workers 8 % 4 % 3 %
Commercial bank employees 18 % 11 % 10 %
Cooks 7 % 4 % 3 %
Electricians 7 % 4 % 3 %
Financial analysts and advisors 12 % 8 % 7 %
IT/software developer 17 % 11 % 10 %
Retail cashiers 4 % 2 % 1 %
Waitress and waiters 5 % 2 % 2 %
Source: own calculations, bold numbers show rates that do not surpass the threshold of 5 %. 
With the exception of retail cashiers and waiters, apprenticeships of the Model 1 type 
generate rates of return to education that are sufficiently high. In Models 2 and 3, the 
rates of return to education fall below the critical threshold of 5 % for the occupations 
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care workers, cooks, and electricians.22 For five out of the ten occupations which we used 
to simulate the costs and benefits of training for firms, apprentice pay guaranteeing 
zero net costs for the firms would be too low to generate rates of return to education 
for apprentices that we consider high enough to attract sufficiently talented youth into 
these programs. 
22  The heterogeneity in the rates and the low rates of return to education, in particular for occupations in the 
service sector, are not surprising, and our simulations correspond more or less to findings that have calculated 
observable rates of return: ‘The average differential is strongly dependent on the sector chosen with the 
differential being strongest for engineering. … At the opposite extreme, there are apprenticeship sectors that 
have a negligible or lower premium than alternatives for people educated to the same level. This includes 
having an apprenticeship in service enterprises (such as hairdressing) for women educated to level 2 or level 
3 and childcare at level 3 (also affecting women). Thus, much like university degrees, one should think of the 
potential ‘returns’ to an apprenticeship as being variable across subject specialism’ (Cavaglia et al. 2017, p.59). 
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7  Summary analyses of the results
Table 4 provides a summary of the results of the net cost simulations for all occupations 
and scenarios. We put in red all of the net costs that are above £ 2,000 and in light green 
all of the net costs or net benefits within a bandwidth of +/– £ 2,000. As we can easily 
see from the colour pattern, the net costs in all models using the low-wage scenario are 
(with one exception) in green or light green, whereas, in the high-wage scenario, about 
half of the occupations and models show red, meaning net costs in the range of about 
one monthly salary or more of a skilled worker. If we observe substantial net costs in the 
models under the high-wage scenario, then the break-even salaries will be below the 
salary used for this scenario and vice versa. 
In the cases where net benefits are extremely high, that is for bricklayers, electricians, 
and IT/software developers, the reasons are as follows. For bricklayers and IT/software 
developers, the main reason lies in the relation of apprentices pay (in the low-wage 
scenario) and productivity of apprentices. Moving to the high-cost scenario reduces 
the net benefits substantially. For electricians, the main reason is the high share of 
skilled work with high levels of productivity (data collected from the underlying Swiss 
observations). Apprentices in this occupation tend to be highly productive during the 
early phase their apprenticeship. In the case of electricians, however, this productivity 
does not automatically lead to higher apprentice pay (see the calculations for break-
even wages in the appendix) or to high net cash benefits for the training firms. The high 
productivity and low costs are used by firms to gain customer contracts because they 
can offer their services at lower costs than competitors that do not employ and train 
apprentices. Therefore, a substantial part of the net benefit shown here is actually a gain 
for the customers. However, in the case of electricians in England, the private rates of 
return to education (see table 3) are not extremely high, and therefore, it is likely that 
a part of the substantial net benefits that training firms could expect should be used 
for higher apprentice salaries, and better training should also lead to a higher wage 
differential between skilled and unskilled electricians. 
Different explanations are needed for the cases where net costs in the high-wage 
scenario are extremely high, as it is the case for car mechanics, commercial bank 
employees, cooks, retail cashiers, and waiters. In the case of car mechanics and cooks, 
it is mainly the high share of practicing that reduces the benefits and would therefore 
legitimate a lower wage than assumed in the high-wage scenario. In the case of 
commercial bank employees, it is the costs of training that would justify a lower pay, and 
in the cases of care workers, retail cashiers, and waiters, it is the low level of salaries as 
well as the small differential between unskilled and skilled salaries that pushes down 
the break-even salaries. If the wage differential between skilled and unskilled salaries 
is small, then the productive contribution of apprentices, when substituting skilled 
Summary of results
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labour at low productivity rates, is also very low. If, however, the wage differential is 
big, then a firm earns more when letting the apprentice substitute skilled workers 
instead of executing unskilled work even at low productivity rates in the first year(s) of 
the apprenticeship training. To give an idea of the heterogeneity in the wage data used 
for these simulations, we used the skill premium (the ratio between skilled workers in 
the occupation and unskilled workers in the same economic sector(s)) that ranges from 
almost 50 % for IT/software developers to just 10–15 % for care workers, retail cashiers, 
and waiters. 
table 4   Net training costs and saved hiring costs for all occupations and scenarios 
England
Low wage scenario High wage scenario
Occupation M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Bricklayers –10,755 –6,816 –12,102 –4,901 –1,427 –2,194
Car mechanics –653 –330 –524 6,790 6,018 12,067
Care workers –6,073 –2,244 –2,845 –1,567 2,153 5,076
Commercial bank employees –2,523 51 –1,511 2,439 4,889 7,181
Cooks –3,598 –1,275 –1,758 1,716 3,827 7,474
Electricians –17,717 –10,009 –18,876 –12,803 –5,315 –10,419
Financial analysts and advisors –8,803 –6,401 –14,943 –3,701 –1,646 –6,225
IT/software developer –6,722 –5,477 –12,201 –1,711 –1,182 –3,875
Retail cashiers –3,693 –701 –121 689 3,349 7,339
Waitress and waiters –1,088 1,792 3,853 3,050 5,742 11,007
Source: own calculations
The net costs in Table 4 are calculated at the end of the training period, and because 
additional benefits can accrue after this point, we compare these net costs in Table 5 
with potential savings in hiring costs if the firm is able to keep the apprentices after 
the training contract has ended. Because we have no representative observational data, 
we compare the net costs with hypothetical savings in hiring costs. Scenario 1 (HC 1) 
for the savings in hiring costs is based on the assumption that a firm can save up to 
four monthly salaries of a skilled employee by not having to hire or instruct someone 
from the labour market. However, the firm is only able to retain half of the trained 
apprentices, which reduces the potentially saved hiring costs to the equivalent of two 
months’ salary of a skilled employee. In scenario 2 (HC 2), we assume that a firm is able 
to retain all the trained apprentices. Because firms could expect a net benefit in almost 
all the occupations given the low-wage scenario or Model 1 in the high-wage scenario, 
we compare the saved hiring costs with Model 2 in the high-wage scenario. Green shows 
all the cases where there is already a net benefit by the end of the training period or 
where potential savings in hiring costs would cover the net costs incurred. Light red 
highlights the cases where the savings fall just short covering the net costs, and red 
highlights the cases where the hiring costs do not cover the net costs. 
Potential savings in  
hiring costs
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table 5   Net training costs (high wage scenario), potential savings in hiring costs and 
rates of return to education for apprentices England
Occupation M2 HC (1) HC (2) RR (M2)
Bricklayers1) –1,427
Car mechanics 6,018
Care workers 2,153
Commercial bank employees 4,889
Cooks 3,827
Electricians –5,315
Financial analysts and advisors –1,646
IT/software developer –1,182
Retail cashiers 3,349
Waitress and waiters 5,742
1)   bricklayers are a particular case as concern hiring costs. they are mainly hired on construction sites as ‘self-employed’ 
and paid at a piece-rate, which means that there are no hiring costs for the building contractors and if their productivity 
is low, the contractors are not going to lose money. 
Source: own calculations
With the exception of waiters, in all occupations, the savings in hiring costs have the 
potential to cover the net costs in a more expensive training model, provided the firms 
are able to retain their apprentices after training. In the final step, we compare the 
perspective of the firm to the one of potential apprentices (see RR M2). Green shows 
all the cases where the rate of return to education is above and light red when the rate 
of return is just around 5 %. The calculations are made for the high-wage scenario and 
the training parameters of Model 2. The comparison of net costs for firms (including 
potential savings in hiring costs) and the rates of return to education for apprentices 
shows that, in the case of electricians, the firms should have the scope to raise the salary 
levels for apprentices such that these could expect sufficiently high rates of return. In 
the cases of care workers, retail cashiers, and waiters, however, the room of manoeuvre 
is likely to be limited, in particular for the latter. In other words, the training models 
for which we have made simulations would not allow firms and apprentices to gain 
sufficiently, and therefore, the willingness of the firms or potential apprentices to train 
or receive training in these occupations according to these parameters would be low. 
Furthermore, because savings on the side of firms like reduced training expenditures 
or lower salaries would further reduce the expected returns of apprentices, changes of 
this nature would not produce the desired outcomes. Two options would exist, however, 
to find a way to increase the attractiveness in these occupations. The first option would 
be for potential apprentices to accept low salaries during training and for firms to 
invest sufficiently in training allowing the apprentices to expect skilled wages that are 
above the levels observed on the UK labour market today. Firms would not incur higher 
net costs and therefore not need to fear poaching from competitors. Additionally, the 
potential apprentices could compensate the lower salaries during training through better 
salary perspective for the following years of their professional life. The second option 
would be for firms to accept net costs during training but to look at it as an investment 
in future middle management positions, where hiring costs are substantially higher 
than for lower level positions. In this option, firms would consider their apprentices as 
the potential future middle managers and the net costs of training apprentices as the 
Motivations to train 
in occupations with 
net costs
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necessary investment into this group of employees. In this case, firms would of course 
have to fear poaching from competitors and therefore would need to make some extra 
arrangements to prevent high turnover rates of their trained apprentices, including the 
provision of firm-specific human capital.
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8  Conclusions and recommendations based 
on the analyses
The simulated cost and benefits of apprenticeship training in this study show the 
potential outcomes for firms from the hypothetical situation in which firms in England 
adopt an apprenticeship-training model that roughly follows the Swiss one. Not 
surprisingly, these simulated costs and benefits show a considerable heterogeneity due 
to differences in the results per occupation in the Swiss data and to variations in the 
wage differentials between unskilled and skilled workers in the ten occupations. Thus, 
the question whether a training firm would have to expect net costs or could rather enjoy 
a net benefit when applying a Swiss-like training model depends on many factors that 
will differ from one occupation to another. Furthermore, the simulations show that, 
within a given occupation, results may vary considerably between firms of different 
sizes.23 In any case, the simulations show that policies targeted to increase the number 
of apprenticeships would need to take into account these heterogeneities between 
occupations, firms, and regions. 
The five main conclusions that we can further draw from our simulations are the following: 
1)  As firms operate with minimum salaries in all our simulations, their chances 
for of breaking even at the end of the training period are highest for three-year 
programs assuming that the apprentices are younger than 19 years24 of age for all 
occupations, because minimum wages increase substantially afterwards. Therefore, 
apprenticeships for young people as an alternative to school-based general education 
or school-based vocational training may produce the best outcomes from the 
perspective of firms. In some occupations, training firms can even have some scope 
to go beyond national minimum wages and thereby also increase the returns of 
apprentices to education. 
2)  From the perspective of apprentices, the programs that would start at an early age, 
even at a very low pay, would in most cases also generate the highest private rates of 
return, compared to scenarios, where the apprentices follow a program at a later age. 
3)  In most occupations and scenarios, big firms have the highest net benefits, whereas 
micro-companies may sometimes even face net costs in scenarios where the average 
firm can expect net benefits. In sectors where micro companies are the backbone of 
the industry, particular policy measures to stimulate firms’ engagement would be 
warranted, whereas bigger firms often do not need special stimuli. The differences 
23  The results would certainly also vary between regions, but we have used national averages throughout our 
simulations. 
24  The assumption about the age is relevant because of the age dependent differences of the current minimum 
wage regulations in the UK. 
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in the net costs or net benefits between firms of different sizes in our simulations 
lie in the fact that the product of different absolute pay levels and different relative 
wages between skilled and unskilled workers. In reality, however, micro companies 
would also have additional disadvantages due to the absence of economies of scale. 
Some of the training costs and entry costs into the programs as such are fixed costs, 
independent of the number of trained apprentices. This situation, in turn, favours 
bigger firms that can spread these costs over many apprentices. 
4)  In most of the ten occupations, at least one or two models and scenario produce 
net benefits or firms can expect saved hiring costs that could offset net costs. Yet 
three occupations in the service and hospitality sector (cooks, retail cashiers, and 
waiters) produce simulation outcomes that show difficulties for firms to break even, 
and at the same time, private rates of return to education for the apprentices are 
very low. In the three cases, the skill premium observable today in the UK labour 
market is too low to guarantee favourable outcomes for firms and apprentices. In 
these occupations and sectors, one would need to see whether an improved quality of 
training would increase the workers’ productivity and wages sufficiently to make the 
training investment worthwhile for firms and potential apprentices. For apprentices, 
an increase in relative wages of skilled employees compared to unskilled workers 
would automatically increase the private rates of return to education. For firms, 
however, this would only improve the cost-benefit situation in the long run if the 
improved quality of training would help them to increase their competitiveness 
and more directly lower their hiring costs for middle management functions. For 
the latter, this would require firms to retain a substantial number of their trainees. 
However, the research literature and empirical observations show that an increase 
of training quality also improves loyalty of employees and thereby reduces turnover 
rates. 
5)  Improvements in the quality of training programs that would improve the labour 
market outcomes of apprentices could be a necessity to secure talented applicants 
for the programs and thereby also reduce dropout rates. The latter may hamper 
the willingness of firms to train in some occupations because they increase the net 
costs of training. Such situation is particularly likely in the high-wage scenarios for 
apprentices and training structures, where apprentices may need certain time to 
become productive.
In sum, one of the major challenges for a successful expansion of an apprenticeship 
training system in England that will create a win-win situation for firms and apprentices 
is a quality improvement in programs. For some of the occupations (see point 4 of 
the conclusions), training that translates into substantial increases in productivity 
compared to the current situation is needed to make these programs attractive for both 
potential training firms and apprentices. If the apprentices and the skilled employees 
thereafter became more productive, this would make it a) financially more attractive 
for firms to use apprentices for skilled work during training and thereby increase the 
training quality again and b) guarantee that graduates of these apprenticeships would 
enjoy a considerably higher skills wage premium observable in today’s labour market. 
In the latter case, the higher private rates of return to education should attract more 
talented candidates into these apprenticeships, which in turn would again improve the 
cost-benefit balance for training firms. 
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Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low wage scenario)
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figure a26  Net costs by firm size – IT and Software Developers England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low wage scenario)
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figure a27   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
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figure a28   Net costs assuming different dropout rates – IT and Software Developers 
England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low and high wage scenario). 
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figure a30  Net costs by firm size – Retail Cashiers England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low wage scenario)
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figure a31   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Retail Cashiers England
Source: own calculations
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figure a32  Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Retail Cashiers England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low and high wage scenario). 
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Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low wage scenario)
–5,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Total3rd year2nd year1st year
N
et
 c
o
st
s 
in
 p
o
u
n
d
s
Net CostsProductivityGross Costs
figure a34  Net costs by firm size – Waiters and Waitresses England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low wage scenario)
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figure a35   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Waiters and Waitresses England
Source: own calculations
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figure a36   Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Waiters and Waitresses 
England
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low and high wage scenario). 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
Dropout rate 25 %Dropout rate 50 %
C
h
an
ge
s 
in
 p
o
u
n
d
s
M2 (high wage)M1 (low wage)
74
Acknowledgments of the authors
The authors of this study would like to particularly thank the following people, who 
have contributed significantly to the success of this whole undertaking: First we thank 
the Bertelsmann Foundation and the JPMorgan Chase Foundation, whose initiative and 
financial support created the opportunity to extend the initial simulations for Spain 
to England and Italy. Second, and in alphabetical order, we would like to thank all the 
people in the two foundations that were instrumental to the successful conclusion 
of this report: Hanka Boldemann, Naemi Härle, Ho Hang, Kamal Motalib, Delphine 
Poschmann, Kirstin Steinmetz, and Clemens Wieland. We would also like to thank the 
Education Policy Institute (EPI), in particular Gerard Domínguez-Reig and Peter Sellen, 
for their tremendous efforts to motivate English firms to participate in the workshops 
and for the provision of data and assistance, and, of course, we would like to thank 
all the firm representatives who were present at the initial presentations and the 
many workshops we held in London. Finally, we would also like to thank Luca Moretti 
(University of Bern) and Professor Samuel Muehlemann (LMU University of Munich) for 
their precious research assistance, helping to adapt the cost-benefit computer tool for 
the present study. 
75
About the authors
Prof. Dr. Stefan C. Wolter is a renowned expert in economics of education with a 
particular focus on vocational education and training. He is the executive director of 
the Swiss Coordination Centre for Research in Education, holds a professorship at the 
University of Bern, acts as permanent visiting professor at the University of Basel and 
serves in numerous expert boards on education. Among others, he is Chair of the Expert 
Group on Vocational Education and Training and Adult Education of the OECD, member 
of the Education Policy Committee as well as member of the board of the Centre for 
Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) of the OECD in Paris. He has published 
numerous books, more than 50 peer-reviewed scientific publications, in journals such 
as the American Economic Review, the Journal of Public Economics or the Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review. Most relevant for this project are his several large-scale surveys 
for the measurement of costs and benefits in dual vocational education in Switzerland, 
and his comparative studies with Austria and Germany, as well as a recent simulation 
study for Spain.
Eva Joho studies economics at the University of Bern, where she works as a research 
assistant at the Centre for Research in Economics of Education. In July 2018, she will 
complete her Master’s degree in Applied Economic Analysis with Specialization in 
Regional Economic Development. Eva Joho’s main areas of research include economics, 
regional economics and personnel economics. 
76
JPMorgan Chase Foundation
J.P. Morgan is committed to building vibrant, resilient communities, preserving our 
environment and promoting an inclusive economic culture across the globe that benefits 
people not only today, but for generations to come. Across 36 countries, J.P. Morgan, 
through the JPMorgan Chase Foundation, has a mission to enable more people to 
contribute to and share in the rewards of a growing economy. We believe that reducing 
inequality and creating widely-shared prosperity requires collaboration of business, 
government, non-profit and other civic organisations, particularly in the cities and 
metropolitan regions that power economic growth. We take a comprehensive approach 
to increasing economic opportunity, using our firm’s global scale, talent and resources 
to make investments and create partnerships in our priority areas. Across Europe, 
Middle East and Africa our focus areas are: Jobs and Skills, Small Business Expansion 
and Financial Capability.
While this report has been supported by the JPMorgan Chase Foundation, the contents 
and opinions in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the JPMorgan Chase Foundation, JPMorgan Chase & Co., or any of its 
affiliates.
Kamal Motalib
Philanthropy Manager
J.P. Morgan Global Philanthropy  
kamal.h.motalib@jpmchase.com
https://www.jpmorgan.com/country/DE/EN/corporate-responsibility
Bertelsmann Stiftung
The Bertelsmann Stiftung promotes social change through project work that focuses 
on ensuring society’s long-term viability. Working with a wide range of partners, the 
Stiftung aims to identify early on social problems and challenges and develop effective 
solutions. As an initiator and driver of necessary reforms, we draw on knowledge and 
expertise to stimulate productive dialogue on the most pressing issues of our day and 
provide policymakers with new insight. 
About us
Hanka Boldemann 
Philanthropy Manager
J.P. Morgan Global Philanthropy
hanka.boldemann@jpmorgan.com
77
about uS
The Bertelsmann Stiftung addresses various topics in education, including career 
guidance in schools, school-to-work transitions and Germany’s dual vocational training 
system. The Stiftung initiates and moderates discussions on these issues, provides 
professional insight by way of expert opinions, and supports the exchange of ideas on 
the international level. 
If you would like to learn more about our activities or need additional copies of this study, 
please contact:
Clemens Wieland
Senior Project Manager
Learning for Life Program
Phone +49 5241 81-81352
clemens.wieland@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en
Education Policy Institute
The Education Policy Institute is an independent, impartial, and evidence-based 
research institute that promotes high quality education outcomes, regardless of social 
background. We achieve this through data-led analysis, innovative research and high-
profile events.
Education can have a transformative effect on the life chances of young people, enabling 
them to fulfil their potential, have successful careers, and grasp opportunities. As well 
as having a positive impact on the individual, good quality education and child wellbeing 
also promotes economic productivity and a cohesive society.
Through our research, we provide insight, commentary, and a constructive critique 
of education policy in England – shedding light on what is working and where further 
progress needs to be made. Our research and analysis spans a young person’s journey 
from the early years through to entry to the labour market.
Gerard Domínguez-Reig
Senior Researcher
Phone +44 20 7340 1160 
gerard.dominguezreig@epi.org.uk
www.epi.org.uk 
Naemi Härle
Project Manager
Learning for Life Program
Phone +49 5241 81-81391
naemi.haerle@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
78
• Makers Academy
• National Council for Further Education (NCFE)
• ProvQ
• Royal Bank of Canada
• Royal Bank of Scotland
• SEMTA
• Skills for Care
• Social Care Institue for Excellence
• Softonic
• The Chemistry Group
• The Institute of the Motor Industry
• The Tech Partnership
• Toyota
• Woodford Homecare
• Allied Healthcare
• ANS Group
• Barrat Developments
• Byron
• Caretech UK
• Carillion Plc
• Citi group
• Compass Group
• Confederation of British Industry
• Construction Industry Training Board (CITB)
•Cuttle Construction
• Dixons Carphone
•  Federation for Industry Sector Skills and  
Standards (FISSS)
• Firebrand Training
• Fujitsu
• HC One
• Hertfordshire City Council
• John Lewis
• JPMorgan
Workshop participants
Imprint
© March 2018 Bertelsmann Stiftung
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
Phone +49 5241 81-0
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Responsible for content
Clemens Wieland
Naemi Härle
Cover photo
Valeska Achenbach
Photos
Hang Ho: JP Morgan
David Laws: Education Policy Institute 
Clemens Wieland: Kai Uwe Oesterhelweg
Professor Stefan C. Wolter: privat
Eva Joho:privat
Graphic design
Nicole Meyerholz
DOI 10.11586/2018008
Address  |  Contact
Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256 
33311 Gütersloh | Germany 
Phone +49 5241 81-0
Clemens Wieland 
Senior Project Manager 
Program Learning for Life  
Phone +49 5241 81-81352 
clemens.wieland@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Naemi Härle 
Project Manager 
Program Learning for Life  
Phone +49 5241 81-81391 
naemi.haerle@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.en
